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This Article argues that the “reasonableness” requirement of Title VII should be rejected. Under this approach,
a plaintiff ’s complaint would be protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was acting in
bad faith at the time she made the complaint. Such a standard would offer employers some protection from
retaliation suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the significant goals the retaliation
provision can serve. Part I provides background on Title VII and the anti-retaliation provision, particularly the
“opposition” clause, explains why the anti-retaliation provision is necessary and how courts have interpreted
the scope of the conduct it protects, and identifies the problem with the current approach, namely, that the
“reasonableness” requirement provides too little clarity as to what conduct is protected and gives courts a
powerful tool by which they can limit the scope of protected conduct under the statute. Part I concludes with
a discussion of the D.C. and Fourth Circuit decisions that illustrate the problems this approach creates. Part II
explains why these decisions are so problematic, especially in the context of hostile work environment claims,
examines how these courts’ definitions of the term “reasonableness” threaten to undercut the anti-retaliation
provision’s effectiveness by discouraging harassment victims from reporting what they are experiencing,
especially in the earliest stages of the harassment, and then argues that the way to address this problem is not
to craft some alternative definition of the term reasonable; rather, the better approach is to reject the
“reasonableness” requirement altogether. Part III explores the benefits of this approach and discusses how a
stronger anti-retaliation provision will serve Title VII’s myriad goals. These benefits relate, in part, to
enforcement: Individuals will be more likely to report conduct if they believe that their complaint will be
protected, and this approach will also facilitate more informal methods of resolving harassment claims. But
the benefits go beyond enforcement. By encouraging individuals to report harassment, the anti-retaliation
provision can facilitate a change in the norms that govern the workplace and can ameliorate the harms that
harassment causes.
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INTRODUCTION 
Enacted to facilitate enforcement of Title VII’s prohibitions on 
workplace discrimination, the statute’s anti-retaliation provision has 
received neither the attention nor the acclaim that has been focused 
on the statute as a whole.  To the contrary, its 
significance⎯particularly its potential significance if interpreted 
appropriately⎯has been underappreciated by commentators and 
courts alike.  Although courts have acknowledged the important role 
the provision plays in encouraging the reporting of Title VII 
violations,1 the provision can⎯and should⎯play a much more 
significant role in achieving the goals Title VII was enacted to realize. 
Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace,2 but it is more 
than a top-down enforcement mechanism, imposing equality values 
on an unwilling society.  It also plays a fundamental role in radically 
reshaping societal norms in a way that can facilitate meaningful 
change from the bottom-up.3  And just as Title VII does more than 
simply provide a rule of liability for those who discriminate, the anti-
retaliation provision can do more than facilitate the imposition of 
that liability.  By ensuring that individuals report possible 
discrimination, it can facilitate open communication about what 
conduct violates that norm, and it can help victims cope with, and 
recover from, the psychological and dignitary harms that such 
discrimination often causes.  But if the anti-retaliation provision is 
interpreted too narrowly, such that it often fails to protect individuals 
who report conduct that they believe violates Title VII, it will be 
unable to serve any of these purposes. 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006) 
(noting that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “secur[es] [Title VII’s] primary 
objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an 
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees”). 
 2. More specifically, the statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).  With this broad prohibition, Title VII is the 
primary federal law regulating discrimination in the workplace.  Although other 
pieces of federal legislation govern aspects of the employment relationship, they are, 
generally speaking, more narrow in scope.  See, e.g., The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (proscribing wage discrimination on the basis of sex); 
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000) 
(prohibiting age discrimination in employment). 
 3. By rejecting the idea that racial stereotypes and gender norms are acceptable, 
Title VII has helped to create a widespread societal commitment to the equality 
principle.  In this sense, Title VII is what Linda Hamilton Krieger has described as a 
“transformative law,” one “aimed at changing social norms which it perceives to be 
unjust or otherwise undesirable.”  Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword:  Socio-Legal 
Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 479 (2000). 
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Yet the interpretation that courts currently give the provision’s 
“opposition” clause suffers from just this flaw.  Under the opposition 
clause, an employer may not “discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII.4  In Clark County 
School District v. Breeden,5 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
could not prevail on his retaliation claims because “no one could 
reasonably believe that the incident [he experienced] violated Title 
VII.”6  The Court did not evaluate possible alternatives to this 
“reasonableness” requirement; nor did it offer any justification for it.  
Instead, it merely assumed that was the appropriate standard because 
it was the one the Ninth Circuit had applied below.7  Indeed, prior to 
Clark County, the courts of appeals had overwhelmingly converged on 
this standard, denying a plaintiff legal protection under the 
provision’s “opposition” clause for any retaliation experienced, unless 
the plaintiff could establish a “good faith, reasonable belief that the 
challenged practice violate[d]” the statute.8 
This standard was originally articulated in response to claims that 
the provision should be construed to protect only individuals who 
opposed practices that were actually unlawful under the statute.9  In 
response to such arguments, the courts expressed concerns that 
“[s]uch a narrow interpretation . . . would not only chill the 
legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but would 
tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek 
conciliation or informal adjustment of grievances.”10  Yet at the same 
                                                          
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 5. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
 6. Id. at 270. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra note 10 (noting several courts of appeals decisions in support of a 
“good faith, reasonable belief” standard under the opposition clause). 
 9. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(discussing the arguments against a narrow interpretation of the opposition clause). 
 10. Id.; see Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (“[I]nterpreting the opposition clause to protect an 
employee who reasonably believes that discrimination exists is consistent with a 
liberal construction of Title VII to implement the Congressional purpose of 
eliminating discrimination in employment.”) (internal quotation marks & citation 
omitted); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“[M]aking the protected nature of an employee’s opposition to alleged 
discrimination depend on the ultimate resolution of his claim would be inconsistent 
with the remedial purposes of Title VII.”); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 
1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that “[t]he district court’s literal reading 
undermines Title VII’s central purpose, the elimination of employment 
discrimination by informal means; destroys one of the chief means of achieving that 
purpose, the frank and nondisruptive exchange of ideas between employers and 
employees; and serves no redeeming statutory or policy purposes of its own”). 
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time, the courts recognized the need to provide employers with some 
protection against retaliation claims based on frivolous complaints,11 
and the courts determined that “[t]he employer is sufficiently 
protected against malicious accusations and frivolous claims by a 
requirement that an employee seeking the protection of the 
opposition clause demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that 
the challenged practice violates Title VII.”12 
Yet this standard, originally intended to construe the opposition 
clause liberally in service of Title VII’s broad remedial purposes, has 
paradoxically had the opposite effect, providing too little protection 
for employees in return for too little benefit to employers.  This result 
was in some sense inevitable:  “Reasonableness” is, in any context, an 
amorphous concept.13  The difficulties in relying on it as a 
decisionmaking tool are only compounded in the context of sexual 
harassment, which is itself a nebulous concept because the unlawful 
conduct generally occurs not in one discrete act, but in repeated 
instances of harassment over time.  This makes it difficult to know 
where exactly the line between the lawful and the unlawful lies.14  The 
ambiguity of the line was bound to make it difficult for plaintiffs to 
know when their complaint would be protected and when it would 
not. 
But two recent courts of appeals decisions illustrate how the 
“reasonableness” requirement can be used to narrow considerably 
                                                          
 11. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1020 (asserting that “[c]ourts have recognized the need to 
balance the employer’s interest in smooth functioning of his business against 
employees’ interest in achieving internal resolution of discrimination disputes”).  
Although employers remain free to fire employees who complain so long as they can 
establish a lawful reason for doing so, that does not mean frivolous complaints are 
not without costs to employers.  Employers must investigate such complaints, and if 
they do decide to fire the employee, the costs of litigating a retaliation claim can be 
substantial, even if the employer ultimately prevails.   
 This concern with balancing the rights of employees and the legitimate business 
interests of employers is a theme that pervades much of Title VII case law, including 
interpretations of the substantive anti-discrimination provision.  See Elizabeth 
Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1996) (stating that opponents of Title VII “feared federal regulation, and the 
creation of a ‘despotic’ regulatory agency that would ‘subject a great part of 
American industry to bureaucratic whims, prejudices and caprices’” (quoting 1 
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS 1298 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 
1970) (remarks of Sen. Tower))). 
 12. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1020. 
 13. Cf. Edward A. Marshall, Title VII’s Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v. 
Adams:  Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 89 
(2003) (claiming that “[t]he rigor with which the lower courts have applied the 
subject matter reasonableness requirement has varied from circuit to circuit”). 
 14. See infra Part II.A (elaborating on the difficulty in defining sexual 
harassment). 
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the protections the anti-retaliation provision offers.15  In one decision, 
the D.C. Circuit suggested that a plaintiff’s belief that conduct was 
unlawful could satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement only if a 
reasonable juror could find that the alleged discrimination was a 
violation of Title VII,16 thereby effectively holding individuals 
accountable for knowing the Title VII case law.  This result is 
especially troubling in the context of sexual harassment, where the 
general public’s perception of what is unlawful likely does not align 
with the definition provided in the case law.17  In the other decision, 
the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff who complained about an 
incident of harassing behavior that was not yet unlawful, but would be 
if repeated, could establish that his belief was reasonable only if he 
could establish that he had reason to believe that the conduct would 
continue.18  This decision, thus, applied the “reasonableness” 
requirement in a way that discourages individuals from reporting 
harassment when it first occurs. 
These decisions are especially problematic given the significant 
role that the anti-retaliation provision, more broadly construed, could 
play in serving the larger objectives of Title VII.  This Article argues 
that the better approach would be to reject the “reasonableness” 
requirement.  Under this approach, a plaintiff’s complaint would be 
protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was 
acting in bad faith at the time she made the complaint.  Such a 
standard would offer employers some protection from retaliation 
suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the 
significant goals the retaliation provision can serve. 
Part I provides background on Title VII and the anti-retaliation 
provision, particularly the “opposition” clause.  It explains why the 
anti-retaliation provision is necessary and how courts have 
interpreted the scope of the conduct it protects.  It then begins to 
identify the problem with the current approach, namely, that the 
“reasonableness” requirement provides too little clarity as to what 
conduct is protected and gives courts a powerful tool by which they 
can limit the scope of protected conduct under the statute.  Part I 
concludes with a discussion of the D.C. and Fourth Circuit decisions 
that illustrate the problems this approach creates. 
                                                          
 15. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006); George v. 
Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 16. George, 407 F.3d at 416. 
 17. See infra Part II.A (explaining the public’s difficulty in distinguishing between 
“offensive” conduct, which is lawful under the statute, and “abusive” conduct, which 
is unlawful under the statute). 
 18. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332. 
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Part II explains why these decisions are so problematic, especially 
in the context of hostile work environment claims.  It examines how 
these courts’ definitions of the term “reasonableness” threaten to 
undercut the anti-retaliation provision’s effectiveness by discouraging 
harassment victims from reporting what they are experiencing, 
especially in the earliest stages of the harassment.  It then argues that 
the way to address this problem is not to craft some alternative 
definition of the term reasonable; rather, the better approach is to 
reject the “reasonableness” requirement altogether.  Originally 
designed to balance the rights of employees and the legitimate 
business interests of employers, the “reasonableness” requirement 
offers relatively little help to employers in comparison to the 
significant harms it imposes on harassment victims.  A better balance 
would be achieved if courts rejected this requirement and instead 
protected a plaintiff’s complaint unless the employer could show that 
the complaint was made in bad faith. 
Part III explores the benefits of this approach and discusses how a 
stronger anti-retaliation provision will serve Title VII’s myriad goals.  
These benefits relate, in part, to enforcement:  Individuals will be 
more likely to report conduct if they believe that their complaint will 
be protected, and this approach will also facilitate more informal 
methods of resolving harassment claims.  But the benefits go beyond 
enforcement.  By encouraging individuals to report harassment, the 
anti-retaliation provision can facilitate a change in the norms that 
govern the workplace and can ameliorate the harms that harassment 
causes.   
I. BACKGROUND 
For most workers around the country, Title VII is their foremost 
source of protection from on-the-job discrimination.  Consistent with 
its libertarian roots, the employment sector in this country historically 
operated on an at-will basis in which both employers and employees, 
at least theoretically, had maximum freedom of movement,19 and 
employees could be fired for any cause or for no cause at all.20  Title 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States:  The Divine 
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65 (2000) (stating that the doctrine of 
at-will employment “has been, and still is, a basic premise undergirding American 
labor law”); see also Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy:  Rethinking 
Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1515-16 (2002) 
(“Prior to [Title VII’s] passage, employment was viewed primarily as a private 
contract between employer and employee.  The law generally did not interfere with 
personnel decisions regardless of their unfairness or irrationality.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will:  The Impending Death of a 
Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653 (2000) (explaining that “the employment 
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VII, however, places some constraints on this freedom by making 
some causes of termination impermissible.21  It also makes it unlawful 
for employers to treat employees differently on account of the 
protected characteristics of race, religion, gender, and national 
origin.22  Thus, when Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,23 it marked, at least theoretically, an important watershed 
in the history of the United States’s treatment of both civil rights and 
the employment sector.24 
A. Title VII 
In the workplace, perhaps more than any other institution in this 
country, individuals with different backgrounds and beliefs come 
together and interact.25  As a result, the workplace provides a space in 
                                                          
relationship, absent a contract to the contrary, is ‘at-will’ meaning that either the 
employer or the employee can terminate the relationship at any time for any reason, 
even for no reason, without legal liability attaching”). 
 21. For an argument that Title VII’s limitations on the at-will employment 
doctrine have been rendered largely illusory by recent Supreme Court decisions, see 
generally William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the 
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will:  
Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 332 (1996) (arguing that 
“management prerogatives are being used to suppress the discrimination laws” and 
“once the whole of discrimination law is weakened by the results in the individual 
cases, employment at will is left reigning over the landscape of employment relations 
because fewer victims of discrimination are willing to sue given their small chances of 
prevailing”). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
947, 947 (1984) (describing the passage of Title VII as the embodiment of the 
second “major statutory revolution[]” in the area of employer-employee relations); 
Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime:  Rights, Theories, and 
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379 (1995) [hereinafter Turner, Thirty Years] (noting 
that the Civil Rights Act has been hailed as “the greatest liberal achievement of the 
decade and the most important civil rights legislation of this century”) (internal 
quotations & footnote omitted).  While Title VII offered the promise of significant 
change in this area, the extent to which it has realized that promise remains the 
subject of significant dispute.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex 
Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1334 (1989) (“What has been the net 
effect of the cascade of laws and lawsuits aimed at eliminating sex discrimination in 
employment?  This is maddeningly difficult to say, but it is possible that women as a 
whole have not benefited and have in fact suffered.”); Turner, Thirty Years, supra, at 
470 (noting that “Title VII protection of incumbent employees may provide 
employers with a disincentive to hire blacks or members of other protected groups”). 
 25. According to commentator Cynthia S. Estlund: 
 [T]he workplace is perhaps the most important sphere in which significant 
integration has taken place. . . .  [I]t is an arena in which individuals interact 
on a daily basis, often over years, within a common enterprise which 
necessitates, to varying degrees, trust and cooperation.  The workplace is 
thus one of the very few settings in which adults spend a significant amount 
of time interacting intensively and constructively with others from different 
families, different neighborhoods, different religions, and, importantly, 
different racial and ethnic groups. 
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which individuals can learn to see beyond stereotypes and to 
recognize the superficialities of the differences that still too often 
divide us.26  At the same time, the diversity of the workplace also 
makes it readily susceptible to hostility and tension, at times 
intentional and at other times not.27  Primarily enacted to provide 
minorities who were then openly excluded from many jobs greater 
access to employment opportunities,28 Title VII’s protections were 
subsequently extended to protect individuals, first minorities and 
later women, from workplace harassment.29  Despite federal, state, 
and local laws all designed to eliminate such harassment in the 
workplace,30 there is considerable evidence that it remains pervasive.31  
Employment laws initially enacted to address explicit discrimination 
                                                          
Cynthia S. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society:  Preliminary Thoughts on 
the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 52-53 (1998). 
 26. See id. at 62 (“[T]he existence of racially integrated workplaces is a matter of 
critical societal importance . . . because they create arenas for continual, constructive 
social interaction among individuals of different racial groups in a society in which 
this is still too infrequent.”); cf. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN 
THE SOUTH 56-57, 72, 170 (1987) (observing that the political alignment of working-
class whites and blacks helped improve interracial social relationships in the South). 
 27. Estlund, supra note 25, at 55-56 (observing that “the workplace, like other 
intermediate institutions, can become an enclave of intolerance, exclusion, 
provinciality, and prejudice on the basis of race, sex, religion, and other salient lines 
of social division”). 
 28. Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 380. 
 29. In one of the earliest cases recognizing the possibility of so-called “hostile 
work environment” claims under Title VII, Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit 
explained that “[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted 
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability 
of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the 
eradication of such noxious practices.”  Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1971).  Liberal constructions of Title VII’s proscriptions, coupled with important 
theoretical works on the serious problem posed by sexual harassment, see CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:  A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979), led courts to recognize Title VII claims based on sexual 
harassment. 
 30. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 507, 507 (1968) (noting the proliferation of state fair employment laws and 
commissions on discrimination established by municipalities to “supplement the 
state commissions”); see also David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment 
Discrimination Law:  Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 145, 
156 (1995) (“While only half the states had comprehensive fair employment practices 
laws at the time of Title VII’s enactment, forty-nine states now have such legislation.  
Much of the current state legislation is broader in coverage than federal legislation.”) 
(internal footnotes omitted); Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII:  State Statutory and 
Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 41 
(1982) (explaining that forty-two states have fair employment practices laws and 
“most mirror the general protections of Title VII”). 
 31. See, e.g., Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth:  Mediating Sexual Harassment 
Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489, 2489 (1997) (“Studies put the 
incidence of sexual harassment at fifty percent to eighty percent of all working 
women, with five percent of men and fifteen percent of women suffering sexual 
harassment each year.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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in hiring and firing are not always well-equipped to address more 
subtle forms of harassment.32 
In its efforts to achieve its various goals, Title VII has supported 
both an ideology and a vision—an ideology about the significance of 
equality in this country and a vision of what a workplace in which that 
ideology was realized would look like.  While there have been 
tremendous strides toward the realization of that vision since Title VII 
was first enacted, much remains to be done.33  The ideology of 
equality has been largely accepted, at least in theory, but its promise 
has not yet been realized.  Different groups are not yet equally 
positioned in the workplace,34 and the norms that govern the 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Conduct:  Title VII as a Tool for 
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 659 (2003) (“Discrimination in the 
workplace today is increasingly less a problem of overt employer policies or targeted 
discriminatory animus than it is a problem of subtle, often unconscious, bias 
creeping into everyday social interactions and judgments on the job.”) (internal 
footnote omitted); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing 
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1991) 
(observing that “[t]he nature of employment discrimination litigation in the federal 
courts . . . has changed considerably since Title VII went into effect . . . . Although 
the authors and early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them 
as tools for opening employment opportunities to blacks, women, and other 
minorities, this is no longer their primary use.”); Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII’s 
Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 236-37 (1994) [hereinafter Turner, A 
Look] (noting that “employers face a diminished risk of Title VII hiring suits” 
because, in part, “an applicant who is not hired by a company may be less likely to 
suspect, and most likely will not be in a position to shape, and prove, a claim of 
discrimination”). 
 33. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies:  A Call for 
Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 601 (2005) 
(claiming that Title VII has produced “obvious substantial improvements in 
distribution of jobs on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity, and a reduction in the 
earnings gap between whites and blacks and men and women,” but that it “has 
neither eliminated discrimination in the workplace nor [produced] complete 
equality”); cf. Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 474 (“Title VII has, to some 
extent, benefited many African-Americans, as exemplified by the rise and existence 
of a black middle class.  The statute has been effective to the extent that employers 
no longer overtly discriminate . . . . Aside from these general observations, the 
available evidence on the impact of Title VII is meager.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women:  An 
Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 61 (1986) (“[T]he data suggests that 
the economic status of women, as indicated by wage differentials and occupational 
segregation, has changed very little relative to white males.”); Symposium, Department 
of Justice and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 PAC. L.J. 765, 795, 798-99 (1995) 
[hereinafter Symposium, Civil Rights Act] (noting that there have been some 
improvements in occupation distribution and wage differentials, but that wage 
differences remain); id. (observing that “unemployment rates for racial minorities 
have remained stubbornly higher than the unemployment rates for Caucasians”); 
Posner, supra note 24, at 1324 (“It is easy enough to find particular instances where 
these laws opened up jobs that were previously closed to women or resulted in a 
realignment of women’s pay scales, but it is difficult to see any major effects on broad 
trends in women’s wages or employment.” (quoting VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S 
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 27 (1988))); Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 
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workplace remain rooted in traditions of the past and have not yet 
been shaped by the new realities of the present.35  As a result, vestiges 
of the old system remain, and women and minorities still struggle to 
find their place—and to make that place comfortable—in the 
modern workplace. 
How then to facilitate Title VII’s efforts to ensure greater progress 
toward the realization of the vision it was enacted to effect?  One fact 
seems clear:  The potential of Title VII’s promise will not be realized 
if individuals are reluctant to report what they perceive to be 
violations of that norm and that vision.  Yet another fact is clear as 
well:  Individuals often are reluctant to report such violations.  There 
are many explanations for this reticence, one of the most obvious 
being the fear of employer retaliation,36 and the statute’s anti-
retaliation provision has not alleviated the concerns of many 
employees. 
That a reluctance to report Title VII violations persists is a serious 
problem because Title VII’s ability to realize its potential depends, 
more so than with much other federal legislation, on the willingness 
of victims of workplace discrimination to bring that discrimination to 
light.37  The remainder of this Part introduces Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision and the recent decisions that threaten to curtail 
its important role in effectuating the statute’s purposes. 
B.  Anti-Retaliation Under Title VII 
The fact that retaliation victims are often afraid to report 
discrimination can hardly be disputed.38  One study found that “more 
than one-third of those who reported unfair treatment took no 
                                                          
478 (claiming that the employment sector remains, to a large degree, “racially 
stratified”). 
 35. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the traditional stereotypes to which women 
continue to be subject cause humiliation and embarrassment in the workplace, 
which leads to psychological, physical, and financial damage). 
 36. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (explaining the reluctance of 
victims of sexual harassment to report harassment due to fears of retaliation). 
 37. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 1000 (maintaining that “the 
EEOC has played an essentially passive role in the growth of employment 
discrimination suits”).  Donohue and Siegelman explain that the EEOC “has brought 
relatively few cases,” and “it seems not to have been responsible for the growth in 
private litigation.”  Id. at 1000.  For further discussion of the EEOC’s lack of authority 
to implement the statute, and the burden on individual victims to enforce the 
provisions of Title VII, see infra note 134. 
 38. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 583, 587-88 (“Prospective Title VII plaintiffs worry about retaliation, 
particularly if they are still employed by the defendant, and worry about being 
labeled ‘trouble makers.’”). 
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further action, and only 3% reported suing their employer.”39  While 
other causes certainly contribute to this reluctance,40 fear of employer 
retaliation appears to be a significant factor.41  One commentator 
revealed that “one ombudsman involved with over 6000 sexual 
harassment victims” claimed that “over seventy-five percent of victims 
express serious concern about some form of retaliatory or adverse 
consequences flowing from their complaint.”42  The fact that 
                                                          
 39. Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation:  Title VII, Print 
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 
241 (2004). 
 40. One commentator has noted “that the most common way victims deal with 
harassment is not to complain, but rather, to avoid or dismiss it.  These passive 
strategies run from simply ignoring the harassment to transferring or quitting one’s 
job.”  Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining:  Law, Humor, and Harassment in the 
Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1154 (2000).  Employees may also 
worry about straining their relationships with co-workers and supervisors, even if they 
do not face formal retaliation.  See, e.g., Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 470-71 
(questioning whether victims should be “concerned that bringing a claim may affect 
[their] future relationship with [their] employer and coworkers, that [their] ongoing 
employment relationship will be strained by [their] daily contact with individuals 
whom [they have] identified as discriminators, or that the employer will in some way 
unlawfully retaliate against [them] because [they] filed a claim”).  Some 
commentators have also expressed concern that certain entities have established  
affirmative roadblocks to the filing of employee complaints.  See, e.g., Anne Lawton, 
The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 838 (2006) 
[hereinafter Lawton, Bad Apple Theory] (claiming that employers have “incentives to 
make reporting more difficult” because “the lower federal courts have failed in their 
oversight of employers’ judgments on how to implement anti-harassment policies 
and procedures”); Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 241-42 (noting the “significant 
barriers confronting plaintiffs, including . . . a managerialized version of dispute 
processes that favors the organization, that the EEOC turns away almost 80% of 
complainants with no relief, that victims are unlikely to file suit, that plaintiffs who 
file lawsuits face low chances of success, and that plaintiffs who manage to win at trial 
are likely to lose on appeal”); Turner, Thirty Years, supra note 24, at 461 (highlighting 
one lawyer’s concern that “EEOC investigators ‘have a strong incentive to discourage 
people from making a charge that is hard to investigate’” (quoting Peter T. Kilborn, 
Backlog of Cases Is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at 10)). 
 41. See, e.g., Turner, A Look, supra note 32, at 239-40 (discussing employee 
concerns about employer retaliation, including whether the “practical costs of 
bringing a claim . . . outweigh the benefits available under the statute”); cf. Yelnosky, 
supra note 38, at 621-22 (surveying the law under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
and concluding that it may not presently be structured to offer much assurance of 
protection from employer retaliation). 
 42. Bond, supra note 31, at 2501; see Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 40, at 
846-47 (discussing Title VII’s reliance on victim reporting in order to be successful 
and noting that that the majority of victims do not report harassment to anyone in an 
authority position).  That many victims perceive that their complaints will do nothing 
to end the behavior also explains why they see no reason to run the risk of retaliation 
by complaining.  See, e.g., Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 34, at 62-63 (asserting 
that women do not complain because of “the inevitable economic and non-economic 
costs which the individual incurs upon filing a complaint,” “the perception which 
women hold of their historical and legal status in society, particularly in the 
workplace,” and because “[h]istorically, women have not fared well in the law”); 
Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness:  Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary 
Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1083-84 (2000) 
(acknowledging the perception that laws are not effective in preventing harassment); 
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complainants, especially in the sexual harassment context, tend to be 
“wom[e]n with low income and little power” only compounds this 
problem.43 
But if people do not complain, the Act’s protections will be largely 
hollow, unable to help achieve the equality of opportunity that its 
authors envisioned.  It is for that reason that the Act required 
employers to “post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its 
premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, 
and members are customarily posted a notice . . . setting forth 
excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this title 
and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.”44  The EEOC, 
too, enacted regulations noting that “[p]revention is the best tool for 
the elimination of sexual harassment” and requiring employers to 
“take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, 
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong 
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees 
of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under 
[T]itle VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”45  But 
notice of these rights is meaningless if individuals do not feel 
comfortable attempting to enforce them.46  Indeed, against the 
                                                          
Quinn, supra note 40, at 1172 (“To use the law instrumentally requires two acts of 
faith, so to speak.  First, one must believe that change is possible.  Second, one must 
judge that the power for this change rests (at least partially) with the law.”).  These 
concerns about the likelihood of prevailing on their claims are hardly irrational.  See, 
e.g., Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 257-58 (“[S]ome social scientists, legal 
scholars, and potential plaintiffs view anti-discrimination law as largely ineffective in 
redressing employment discrimination, as biased in favor of defendants, and as 
providing very weak remedies for those who actually experience workplace 
discrimination.”).  Of course, if it is true, as has been noted, that the media 
“portray[s] greater win rates and higher award amounts in employment 
discrimination lawsuits than is the case in federal court outcomes,” id. at 251, that 
may undercut somewhat this explanation for employees’ unwillingness to sue. 
 43. Bond, supra note 31, at 2500; see Hodges, supra note 33, at 612 (“Data . . . 
indicate[s] that lower paid employees are less successful than higher paid employees 
both in litigation and . . . have less access to courts.”); id. at 609 (“The cost of 
litigating such claims is beyond the means of the average employee and an even 
greater hurdle for the discharged employee with substantially reduced income.”).  
Indeed, Donohue and Siegelman note that some believe “civil rights opponents 
intended the private enforcement mechanism as a deliberate road-block to plaintiffs’ 
effective pursuit of their rights, especially given that ‘many of those discriminated 
against would be poor and legally unsophisticated.’”  Donohue & Siegelman, supra 
note 32, at 1023 (quoting PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS 28 
(1985)).   
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a) (2000). 
 45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f). 
 46.  It is this concern that led two commentators to question whether “relying on 
individual citizens to bring suits is the most effective enforcement strategy.”  
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 1023.  As they explain, “if enforcement is 
left in the hands of private litigants, and if private and social incentives to bring suit 
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backdrop of the Jim Crow system in the South,47 the idea that there 
might be a gap between the law in theory and the law in practice 
would be familiar to many of the Act’s intended beneficiaries.48 
Thus, Congress enacted the anti-retaliation provision to try to 
ensure that individuals would be willing to report violations of the 
Act.49  The anti-retaliation provision provides that 
it [is] unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate against any of 
his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this title . . . or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title . . . .50 
Although there has been considerable litigation under Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision,51 significant questions about the scope of 
that provision’s protections remain.  It was only last term that the 
Supreme Court began to provide guidance as to what the term 
“discrimination” means in that context.52  And that question is 
actually secondary to another question raised in many Title VII 
                                                          
differ, the system may fail to produce the optimal amount (and perhaps the optimal 
composition) of litigation.”  Id. 
 47. See generally D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets:  Title VII, Equality, and the 
Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311 (1994) (describing racial relations during the 
1950s and Title VII’s impact on the historic conflicts of that era). 
 48. Cf. Christine Jolls, The Role and the Functioning of Public-Interest Legal 
Organizations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 146, 169 (Richard B. Freeman et 
al. eds., 2005) (explaining that workers “benefit from a host of specific prohibitions 
on arbitrary or inappropriate behavior by employers,” but that “[t]here is . . . a 
critical and oft-emphasized distinction between the law ‘on the books’ and the law ‘in 
action,’” and that this distinction is “clearly important in the employment law 
context, where employees are ordinarily not in a strong position to enforce”).   
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
 50. Id.  Title VII’s explicit prohibition on retaliation distinguishes it from some 
other civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)).  The Supreme Court has, however, interpreted Title IX’s 
prohibition on sex-based discrimination to encompass a prohibition on retaliation.  
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005).  Likewise, some 
lower courts have interpreted § 1981 to prohibit retaliation.  See, e.g., Hawkins v. 1115 
Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (maintaining the view that, “in 
light of the broad sweep of § 1981(b), . . . a retaliation claim may be brought under 
§ 1981”); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting, in the 
context of racial discrimination, that “a claim of retaliation . . . can violate both Title 
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981”).  Nonetheless, whether § 1981 prohibits retaliation 
remains unsettled. 
 51. Between 1997 and 2006, the number of retaliation claims brought under 
Title VII increased by twenty percent.  EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1999 Through FY 
2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited June 16, 2007).  
 52. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006) (holding 
that “Title VII’s substantive [anti-discrimination] provision and its anti-retaliation 
provision are not coterminous” and that “[t]he scope of the anti-retaliation provision 
extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and 
harm”). 
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retaliation cases, that is, whether an employee’s conduct in opposing 
perceived discrimination or harassment is “protected,” thereby 
entitling the employee to the statute’s safeguards in the first place.  
After all, if the plaintiff has neither “opposed” a practice made 
unlawful by the statute nor “participated” in a proceeding under it, it 
is immaterial, at least from a legal perspective, whether the employer 
fired or otherwise retaliated against the plaintiff in response to that 
conduct.  Because of the background regime of at-will employment, 
the employer may fire the employee because of the complaint, and 
the employee will have no legal recourse.  Thus, the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protection of employees can be no broader than the 
definition of what conduct it protects.  It is to that issue that I turn 
next. 
C. Defining Protected Conduct 
The anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause largely delivers 
what it promises:  absolute protection from retaliation for 
participation, of any kind, in a proceeding related to Title VII.53  In 
contrast, it is much less clear that the opposition clause delivers what 
it promises.  This is because, in part, it is not clear what exactly it does 
promise.  While there is little dispute that the clause describes some 
category of conduct broader than the provision’s “participation” 
clause, the language of the provision does not make it at all clear just 
how broad a category that is. 
To determine whether any given plaintiff has, in fact, “opposed a 
practice made unlawful by Title VII,” courts must answer not one, but 
two, discrete questions.  The first question is whether the form of the 
complaint constitutes “opposition”; the second is whether that 
opposition was directed toward “conduct made unlawful by Title 
VII.”54  Although courts have been grappling with these questions 
since Title VII’s enactment over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court 
has yet to address the first question and only recently provided 
limited guidance with respect to the second.55 
Despite the lack of Supreme Court guidance on the first question, 
it seems fairly well-settled in the courts of appeals that “opposition to 
                                                          
 53. Dorothy E. Larkin, Note, Participation Anxiety:  Should Title VII’s Participation 
Clause Protect Employees Participating in Internal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV. 1181, 1191 
(1999). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 55. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 270, 271 (2001) (per 
curiam), which turned on the reasonableness of the victim’s belief that the action 
complained of violated Title VII). 
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a Title VII violation need not rise to the level of a formal complaint to 
receive statutory protection.”56  Thus, for example, a plaintiff is 
protected if she “mak[es] complaints to management, writ[es] critical 
letters to customers, protest[s] against discrimination by industry or 
by society in general, and express[es] support of co-workers who have 
filed formal charges.”57  Some courts have also held that “opposition” 
encompasses efforts to deter future acts of discrimination, as 
illustrated in EEOC v. HBE Corp.58  In HBE Corp., the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in protected conduct when 
he refused to fire another employee because he believed that the 
employer’s decision was racially motivated.59  The court explained 
that “[o]pposition must be based on a reasonable belief that an 
employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct, and it can include 
refusal to implement a discriminatory policy.”60  In EEOC v. Navy 
Federal Credit Union,61 the plaintiff objected to losing supervisory 
authority over an employee and refused to sign what she viewed as a 
misleading evaluation of that employee because she believed it was all 
part of a scheme to terminate the employee in retaliation for her 
allegations of discrimination.62  The Fourth Circuit held that this 
conduct was protected, noting that “protected oppositional activities 
may include ‘staging informal protests and voicing one’s own 
opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s discriminatory 
activities.’”63  
In answering the second question, whether a plaintiff’s opposition 
was directed toward conduct made unlawful under Title VII, most 
courts have held that “an employment practice need not actually 
violate Title VII for the protected activities element of a retaliation 
claim to be satisfied.  The plaintiff is only required to have had a 
good faith, reasonable belief that [s]he was opposing an employment 
practice made unlawful by Title VII.”64  Thus, a plaintiff may be able 
                                                          
 56. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 57. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 58. 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 59. Id. at 557. 
 60. Id. at 554. 
 61. 424 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id. at 406. 
 63. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 64. McHenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001); see Trent v. 
Valley Elec. Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] plaintiff does not need to 
prove that the employment practice at issue was in fact unlawful under Title VII.”); 
Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., 40 F.3d 187, 195 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The conduct a 
plaintiff opposes need not actually violate Title VII.”) (citation omitted); Sisco v. J.S. 
Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[A]s long as the employee 
had a reasonable belief that what was being opposed constituted discrimination 
GOROD.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 8/6/2007  10:15:25 PM 
1484 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:6 
to prevail on a retaliation claim even if a jury ultimately determines 
that the activity about which the plaintiff complained was not 
discrimination.  Although it might initially seem counter-intuitive 
that an employer that never engaged in unlawful discrimination 
would nonetheless retaliate against an employee, it is actually 
unsurprising that an employer who did not initially discriminate 
might nonetheless respond negatively to an employee complaint.  In 
fact, in the case in which an employer did nothing wrong, the 
employer might be that much more likely to respond negatively to an 
employee complaint because the employer might view the complaint 
as frivolous and the employee who made it as a troublemaker.  
Responding to such complaints requires time and energy on the part 
of the employer, and an employer who believes that a particular 
employee is likely to make a practice of filing frivolous complaints 
may deem it in his best interest to sever the employment relationship. 
While the courts of appeals seem to have largely settled on this 
standard, differences are starting to emerge in how that standard is 
applied.  This result is hardly surprising, given that the standard 
actually says little about what a plaintiff must show in practice to 
establish that her conduct is protected.  What does it mean, one 
might well wonder, for an individual’s belief to be reasonable?  
Because the standard is, in part, objective, it makes sense that there 
must be some baseline against which the plaintiff’s beliefs are 
measured, but what is the appropriate standard?  Should it be the 
governing case law, or the general public’s views, or some other 
alternative altogether?  What if the plaintiff could not have 
reasonably believed that the practice she was opposing was unlawful, 
whatever that means, but the conduct about which she complained 
would have been unlawful had it continued into the future? 
The answers two courts of appeals recently provided to these 
questions show how easily the anti-retaliation provision’s protections 
can be undermined when plaintiffs must establish the reasonableness 
of their beliefs to merit protection.  Just as troubling as these answers 
is what they reveal more generally about the “reasonableness” 
standard, that is, the significant variation in application that it 
permits.  This variation is particularly problematic in the case of the 
                                                          
under Title VII, the claim of retaliation does not hinge upon a showing that the 
employer was in fact in violation of Title VII.”) (internal citation & quotation marks 
omitted); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th 
Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (agreeing that “it was sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
if [the plaintiff] had a reasonable belief that defendant had engaged in the unlawful 
employment practices”). 
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anti-retaliation provision because its success depends, in large 
measure, on the consistency and uniformity of its application. 
 
D. The Questions:  Applying “Reasonableness” 
These recent courts of appeals decisions raise two discrete, albeit 
related, questions about what it means for a plaintiff to have a “good 
faith, reasonable belief” that a given employment practice is unlawful.  
Both of these questions lurked in the background of the single case 
in which the Supreme Court confronted the question of what it 
means for a plaintiff to oppose conduct made unlawful by Title VII.  
In Clark County School District v. Breeden,65 the female plaintiff’s job 
required her to review applicants’ psychological examinations.66  One 
of the examinations reported that the applicant had once told a co-
worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand 
Canyon.”67  At a meeting, the plaintiff’s supervisor read the comment 
aloud, looked at the plaintiff and stated, “I don’t know what that 
means,” at which point a co-worker said, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” and 
both men chuckled.68  The Court assumed, without deciding, that 
those comments did not need to be unlawful for the plaintiff’s 
complaint about them to be protected under Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision.69  The Court nonetheless concluded that the 
plaintiff’s claim failed because “[n]o reasonable person could have 
believed that the single incident [about which the plaintiff 
complained] violated Title VII’s standard,”70 which provides that 
harassment is not actionable unless it is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment.”71 
The result in that particular case is unsurprising.  The sexually 
explicit comment was in a report the plaintiff was required to review 
as part of her job; the co-workers’ response was relatively innocuous; 
and none of the comments were directed at the plaintiff.72  Yet two 
                                                          
 65. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
 66. Id. at 269, 271. 
 67. Id. at 269. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 270. 
 70. Id. at 271. 
 71. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted).  Katherine Franke has noted that Meritor Savings Bank 
adopted much of MacKinnon’s perspective “[s]even years after MacKinnon made the 
argument for understanding sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.”  
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 704 
(1997). 
 72. Clark County, 532 U.S. at 271. 
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important questions were left unasked, not to mention unanswered, 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County.  While these 
questions have yet to receive sustained treatment in the courts of 
appeals, the early answers suggest that the courts may be poised to 
limit workers’ ability to sue when they are retaliated against for 
claiming that they have been the victims of discrimination. 
In Clark County, it seems indisputable that no reasonable juror 
could have concluded that the conduct at issue constituted “sexual 
harassment.”  But does that necessarily render unreasonable the 
plaintiff’s belief that it was unlawful?  It is just that position that the 
D.C. Circuit seems to have implicitly taken in George v. Leavitt.73  
There, the plaintiff, an African-American woman from Trinidad and 
Tobago named Diane George, complained that her co-workers 
made insulting and demeaning statements to her.  On different 
occasions, she was told by three separate employees to “go back to 
Trinidad” or to “go back to where [she] came from.”  On these and 
other occasions, her co-workers shouted at her, told her that she 
should never have been hired, and told her to “shut up.”74 
Shortly after she complained about these incidents to her 
supervisor, the supervisor met with the rest of the staff and told them 
to keep their distance from the plaintiff.75  The plaintiff eventually 
sued under Title VII, “claiming unlawful discrimination based on 
race, sex, and national origin; a hostile work environment; and 
retaliation.”76 
After noting that “offhand teasing” cannot create a hostile work 
environment, the court concluded that the district court 
correctly recognized that the facts alleged by George, even if true, 
would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that George’s 
workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.”  At best, they constitute exactly the sort of 
“isolated incidents” that the Supreme Court has held cannot form 
the basis for a Title VII violation.77 
                                                          
 73. 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  This holding would not eviscerate the well-
established rule that a plaintiff can prevail on her anti-retaliation claim even if the 
conduct about which she complained was not unlawful.  In any given case, a jury 
could find for the plaintiff on her retaliation claim and find that the complained-
about conduct was not unlawful.  That does not mean that a reasonable jury could not 
have found otherwise as to the discrimination claim. 
 74. Id. at 407-08 (alteration in original). 
 75. Id. at 408. 
 76. Id. at 410. 
 77. Id. at 416-17 (alteration in original). 
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With no additional analysis, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim.  It concluded that “the incidents of which George 
complained could not reasonably be thought to constitute an abusive 
working environment in violation of Title VII.”78  Thus, with no 
discussion, the D.C. Circuit seems to have assumed that the 
appropriate benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff’s belief was the definition of “sexual harassment” established 
in the case law.  It appears to have assumed, as well, that the only 
conduct it should consider was the past harassing conduct, and that it 
need not consider whether a continuation of that conduct would 
have created a hostile work environment.79 
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to give this latter question 
sustained attention.  In Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corporation,80 the 
plaintiff alleged that he was in a room with a co-worker who was 
watching television when the news reported that John Allen 
Muhammed and Lee Boyd Malvo, the individuals responsible for the 
2002 D.C. area sniper attacks,81 had been captured.82  In response to 
that report, the co-worker exclaimed that “[t]hey should put those 
two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the 
apes f—k them.”83  Following this incident, the plaintiff complained 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 417. 
 79. The Second Circuit has suggested that it might adopt a similar approach, 
although it has not yet definitively reached the issue.  In Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 
the plaintiff complained about, among other things, the fact that a co-worker, in a 
phone conversation, had begun a sentence by saying “if you think my pecker is 
getting in the way,” at which point she hung up the phone.  95 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  The court noted that the “plaintiff likely would not have passed the 
‘good faith reasonable[ness]’ test . . . if the only evidence offered at trial had been 
[the co-worker’s] isolated comment,” but it declined to reach that issue because it 
found that “a review of the record reveals that the evidence presented to the jury 
included more than this one remark.”  Id. at 1179 (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted).  The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has suggested that a single isolated 
comment can make conduct protected under Title VII.  In Alexander v. Gerhardt 
Enterprises, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s conclusion that the 
plaintiff reasonably believed that she was opposing a practice made unlawful under 
Title VII when she complained about the statement “if a [n-word] can do it, anybody 
can do it” was not clearly erroneous.  40 F.3d 187, 190, 195-96 (7th Cir. 1994).  
There, the court did not resolve whether that statement created a hostile work 
environment because plaintiff did not bring such a claim.  Id. at 190.  It is worth 
noting, however, that the Seventh Circuit treated this as a finding of fact, rather than 
a question of law, and thus evaluated the district court’s conclusion under a very 
deferential standard of review.  Id. at 195. 
 80. No. 05-1485 (4th Cir. May 12, 2006), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 05-1485, 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006), affirmed on reh’g, 458 F.3d 332 
(4th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 2036 (2007). 
 81. James Dao & Lisa A. Bacon, Young Suspect in Sniper Case Becomes Central Figure 
in a Trial That Is Not His, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A12. 
 82. Jordan, No. 05-1485, slip op. at 4. 
 83. Id. 
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to a number of his supervisors, claiming that he was offended and 
that he did not believe his co-worker should “speak so callously in the 
office.”84  During the month following his complaint, the plaintiff 
alleged that his shift was changed; he was given additional work 
assignments; a supervisor made a derogatory remark to him; and he 
was ultimately fired because “he was ‘disruptive,’ his position ‘had 
come to an end,’ and IBM employees and officials ‘don’t like you and 
you don’t like them.’”85 
The Fourth Circuit “readily conclude[d] that [the plaintiff] was 
not” complaining of an actual hostile work environment because the 
isolated comment “was not directed at any fellow employee[,]” and 
was a “singular and isolated exclamation.”86  Therefore it did not 
“alter[] the terms and conditions of his employment.”87  The Fourth 
Circuit also held that it was not sufficient that “Jordan reasonably 
concluded that the remark was inappropriate and should not have 
been made,” because he failed to show that he had “a reasonably 
objective belief that [the opposed conduct would] continue or 
[would] be repeated.”88  The court explained that “an employee 
seeking protection from retaliation must have had an objectively 
reasonable belief in light of all the circumstances that a Title VII 
violation had happened or was in progress.  Thus, we cannot simply 
assume, without more, that the opposed conduct will continue or will 
be repeated unabated.”89 
Judge King dissented, disagreeing with his colleagues that “an 
employee lacks Title VII protection for reporting racially charged 
conduct, unless he has ‘a reasonably objective belief that it will 
continue or will be repeated.’”90  He instead took the position that 
“employees are protected under Title VII from employer retaliation if 
they oppose conduct that, if repeated, could amount to a hostile work 
environment . . . even absent an independent basis for believing the 
conduct might be repeated.”91 Judge King expressed concern that the 
majority’s decision would result in employees 
fac[ing] . . . a “Catch-22.”  They may report such conduct to their 
employer at their peril (as Jordan did), or they may remain quiet 
and work in a racially hostile and degrading work environment 
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 8, 9. 
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. Id. at 9, 10. 
 89. Id. at 10. 
 90. Id. at 23 (King, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 91. Id. at 24. 
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with no legal recourse beyond resignation.  Of course, the essential 
purpose of Title VII is to avoid such situations.92 
Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below,93 if the employee 
fails to report the harassing behavior, the employer may have an 
affirmative defense to liability should the employee eventually sue 
after the behavior becomes too much to bear.94  This “Catch-22” 
scenario that Judge King predicted reflects a more general problem 
with the “reasonableness” requirement, namely, that individuals 
cannot know when their complaints will be protected and when they 
will not. 
II. CHANGING THE PARADIGM:  REJECTING “REASONABLENESS” 
While retaliation claims can be brought—and often are brought—
in the context of many different kinds of discrimination claims, they 
often present particularly challenging questions in the context of 
sexual harassment.  Consider, for example, the following 
hypothetical.  Rosa Smith is talking with one of her co-workers when 
another co-worker comes up behind her, pinches her, and says with a 
sneer, “I bet you enjoyed that, honey.”  Although it is the first time 
she has ever experienced that kind of treatment at work, she is both 
embarrassed and offended by the co-worker’s conduct, and she 
reports the incident to her supervisor.  She describes the incident, 
                                                          
 92. Id. at 25.  Following its decision, the court granted the plaintiff’s petition for 
rehearing and vacated its original decision.  Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., No. 05-
1485, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006).  On rehearing, the court 
affirmed its earlier decision.  Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 
2006).  On plaintiff’s request for the court to rehear the case en banc, five judges 
voted to rehear the case, and five voted not to do so.  Because a majority of the full 
court was required to go en banc, the plaintiff’s request was denied.  Jordan v. 
Alternative Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006).  Judge King again dissented 
from that decision.  This time, he was joined by four other judges of the court.  He 
also “urge[d] the Supreme Court to accord serious consideration to any petition for 
certiorari that Jordan may file.”  Id. at 383 (King, J., dissenting). 
 93. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s requirement of early 
reporting in the context of employer liability). 
 94. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1989) (“In deciding whether a defendant’s 
behavior created an environment that was ‘intimidating, hostile, or offensive,’ courts 
often dismiss the plaintiff’s perceptions.  Some courts discount the anguish reported 
by the plaintiff, because of factors such as timorousness or delay in reporting the 
harassing conduct.”) (footnote omitted); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical 
Vacuum:  The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 
243 (2004) [hereinafter Lawton, Operating] (“[C]ourts engage in fact-finding on 
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, concluding that 
any ‘delay’ in reporting equals an unreasonable failure on the part of the plaintiff to 
use her employer’s reporting machinery.”).  Lawton notes the oddity of this 
response, given that empirical research shows that while “formal reporting of sexual 
harassment is an uncommon occurrence, retaliation in response to such complaints 
is not.”  Lawton, Operating, supra, at 243, 254-55. 
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explains how it made her feel, and asks the employer to try to prevent 
similar incidents from occurring in the future.  The employer 
promptly fires Rosa for complaining about her co-worker’s conduct 
and does nothing to the harassing co-worker. 
A.  The Problem 
Viewed against the background of the case law on sexual 
harassment, this hypothetical hardly presents a unique situation.  To 
the contrary, it is merely the beginning of the scenarios described in 
many hostile work environment cases, and the iterative nature of 
these claims makes clear why the questions raised by the George and 
Jordan cases are so important. 
In the hostile work environment context, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that not every offensive utterance or epithet is actionable 
under Title VII;95 rather, “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”96  
In determining whether conduct is “severe or pervasive,” the 
Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to consider “all the 
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory 
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”97  
Thus, the Court has tried to provide some guidance as to when 
conduct is unlawful, but that guidance hardly provides definitive 
answers as to how a court will rule in any given case. 
To the contrary, all this guidance makes clear is that there is a line 
between conduct that is merely “offensive” and conduct that is 
“abusive,” and that line is sometimes fine.98  Indeed, one 
                                                          
 95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (noting that Title VII “takes 
a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and 
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury”). 
 96. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted). 
 97. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 98. As one commentator has noted, “[b]ecause aggression is so pervasive and 
integral to social life, yet simultaneously ambiguous and subtle, it is—not 
surprisingly—difficult to create a working legal definition of harassment, i.e., of that 
particular category of severe and repetitive emotional abuse that a humane legal 
system might want to prohibit.”  Brady Coleman, Pragmatism’s Insult:  The Growing 
Interdisciplinary Challenge to American Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 239, 242 (2004).  Even Justice Scalia has noted that the word “‘[a]busive’ (or 
‘hostile,’ which in this context I take to mean the same thing) does not seem to me a 
very clear standard,” and the level of “clarity is [not] at all increased by adding the 
adverb ‘objectively’ or by appealing to a ‘reasonable person[’s]’ notion of what the 
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commentator has noted that “[w]hile judges and scholars try to 
define and explain hostile environment sexual harassment, its 
meaning—a nimble Houdini of legal doctrine—continues to escape 
their chains.”99  If judges and scholars cannot arrive at a satisfactory 
definition of sexual harassment, how are workers supposed to 
anticipate how the courts will define it in any given case?  And if 
courts struggle to determine where exactly that line falls in individual 
cases, is it any surprise that employees, unfamiliar with the law, may 
wonder as well? 
Moreover, in some cases, the difficulty is not in knowing where the 
line falls, but in knowing that the line exists at all.  The prevalence of 
sexual harassment, and the burgeoning efforts of employers to 
ameliorate it, means there is much popular writing aimed at helping 
women to recognize what behavior is sexual harassment.100  
Unfortunately, that advice is not always perfect.  Many employers now 
have sexual harassment materials that warn employees against any 
teasing or flirting behavior in the workplace.101  While the fineness of 
the line between the legal and the illegal makes it sensible for such 
material to warn against any potentially inappropriate behavior, it 
may cause individuals to believe that any such conduct is not only 
inappropriate, but also illegal.  Thus, employees like the one in the 
hypothetical will be tempted to report such behavior the very first 
time it occurs, despite the fact that an isolated incident of such 
                                                          
vague word means.”  Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (final alteration in 
original). 
 99. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 
448 (1997); see id. at 449 (“Because courts have been unable to enunciate a clear 
standard, juries remain unguided, as do men and women in the workplace.”); 
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment 
and the First Amendment:  No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 528-29 (1995) 
(noting that some have argued that “employers do not know what exactly Title VII 
prohibits as sexual harassment” because “the definition of hostile environment sex 
harassment is entirely context specific, takes into account multiple factors [and] does 
not define how much of any one factor is required”). 
 100. See infra note 101 (describing some common literature provided to women 
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace). 
 101. One book on sexual harassment explains that “[a]ny unwanted or 
inappropriate sexual attention is sexual harassment.  That includes touching, looks, 
comments, or gestures.”  ELIZABETH BOUCHARD, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT 21 (rev. ed. 1994).  Although the book also noted that 
“[s]exual harassment almost always happens over and over,” and “[t]he offensive 
gesture, invitation or action is repeated again and again,” these statements appeared 
to be descriptive, and not definitional.  Id. at 23.  The book encourages women to 
“[j]ust say no to any advances, right from the start,” id. at 38, and explains that “the 
worst thing you can do is to ignore harassment.”  Id. at 41.  The book encourages 
women to write a letter to the harasser, id. at 43, and, if that does not work, to “go to 
someone in charge and report what’s going on.”  Id. at 44. 
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conduct is only rarely sufficient to establish a “hostile work 
environment.”102 
After all, when an employee in Rosa’s situation feels that she has 
been the victim of discrimination, her belief is most often intuitive; it 
is the product not of a studious examination of the Federal 
Reporters, but rather the product of popular understanding.  The 
D.C. Circuit’s approach—what I call “the reasonable juror 
standard”—assumes the contrary, however, because when jurors 
determine whether conduct is unlawful under Title VII, they are 
doing so after an instruction in the appropriate law to apply.103  The 
D.C. Circuit’s approach, although appealing in its simplicity, does not 
identify this premise on which it implicitly rests, that is, that the 
benchmark for determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
belief should be what the law is, rather than what the general public 
believes it to be.  In other words, the D.C. Circuit’s approach 
effectively holds plaintiffs responsible for knowing the current state 
of the case law on “hostile work environment.”104 
                                                          
 102. Although a single incident can be sufficient to constitute sexual harassment, 
it must be sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment.  See, 
e.g., Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Although 
Holdsworth made his obscene comments only on one occasion, the evidence is that 
he did so at length, loudly, and in a large group in which Howley was the only female 
and many of the men were her subordinates.  And his verbal assault included charges 
that Howley had gained her office of lieutenant only by performing fellatio.”). 
 103. See generally Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform:  Improving the 
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081 (2001) (discussing the need for 
clearer jury instructions so that juries will comprehend the relevant law and make 
better decisions). 
 104. The D.C. Circuit is not the only court to take this view.  One commentator 
has noted that “the [Supreme] Court’s lengthy recitation of sexual harassment 
caselaw before dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint as ‘unreasonable’ [in Clark 
County] belies any notion that a layperson’s perception of unlawfulness of the 
challenged conduct will shield opposition activity from employer retaliation.”  
Marshall, supra note 13, at 93. 
 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has rejected the argument that: 
[W]hen judging the reasonableness of [the plaintiffs’] belief, we should not 
charge them with substantive knowledge of the law as set forth in . . . the 
cases cited above.  We reject the plaintiffs’ argument because it would 
eviscerate the objective component of our reasonableness inquiry.  If the 
plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the 
reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their 
subjective knowledge. 
Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(citation omitted). 
 The difference between the D.C. Circuit and Eleventh Circuit’s approaches is that 
the latter court suggested that while it must hold plaintiffs responsible for knowing 
the state of the law in an area, the fact that they sometimes make mistakes in their 
understanding of that law will not automatically render their belief unreasonable.  In 
Harper, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not have believed that 
Blockbuster’s policy on hair lengths was unlawful because that claim “[was] belied by 
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In some contexts, such an approach might present little cause for 
concern.  For example, most people would know that an employer’s 
decision to fire an individual because of her race violates the law, 
even if they could not name the precise law that it violates.  And, 
indeed, most people would also correctly assume that if an 
employee’s supervisor repeatedly told her he wanted to have sex with 
her and touched her inappropriately, that conduct would be 
unlawful.  However, as discussed above, “hostile work environment” 
claims are unique in that by “[t]heir very nature [they] involve[] 
repeated conduct,”105 and their beginnings may be inappropriate, but 
not unlawful.  Thus, this context seems to threaten to produce a high 
number of false positives, or situations in which members of the 
general public might assume that conduct was unlawful even though 
the conduct clearly is not unlawful under well-established case law.106  
One commentator has noted that 
holding laypersons to a standard that requires not only familiarity 
with caselaw, but the ability to distinguish precedent based on the 
facts of a given case before their opposition to an employer’s policy 
is protected under Title VII . . . undeniably has the potential to 
expose many individual complainants to employer retaliation 
without redress.107 
                                                          
the unanimity with which the courts have declared grooming policies like 
Blockbuster’s non-discriminatory.”  Id. at 1388. 
 105. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). 
 106. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[i]f a witness in a Title VII proceeding 
were secure from retaliation only when her testimony met some slippery 
reasonableness standard, she would surely be less than forthcoming.”  Glover v. S.C. 
Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).  There is no reason to 
think that this “slippery” standard will not also make individuals more hesitant to 
oppose practices made unlawful under Title VII. 
 107. Marshall, supra note 13, at 91.  Marshall also notes that when the 
[u]nlawfulness of the challenged practice [is] “measured against existing 
substantive law” . . . an employee engaging in opposition conduct runs a 
significant risk that his actions will fall outside the range of “protected 
activity” under the opposition clause, since the courts applying that standard 
have been unmoved by arguments regarding the reasonableness of the 
average layperson’s belief as to what might constitute unlawful employment 
discrimination. 
Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted).  Similarly, another commentator writes: 
Sexual harassment often partakes, at least to some degree, of “I-know-it-
when-I-see-it-ness.”  The average person can likely distinguish between a 
tentative, but unwanted, sexual overture or a clumsy compliment on the one 
hand and a hostile and demeaning series of sexual threats and mockeries on 
the other.  Nonetheless, to the extent that talk of sexual harassment tends 
inevitably to generate some hostile comments and questions, some of the 
ridicule and hostility may arise out of a deeply felt sense that sexual 
harassment doctrine is filled with vagueness and contradictions. 
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination:  Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
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There is considerable reason to think that this theoretical 
possibility is likely a reality.  Although commentators have noted the 
ability of legal norms to shape social norms and vice versa,108 
commentators have also noted that “popular understandings are not 
necessarily the same as the technical legal definition.”109  Moreover, 
employees’ understandings of what constitutes harassment will be 
shaped in large part by media accounts.110  Thus, to the extent that 
the media paints a broader picture of sexual harassment, the general 
public may begin to accept that belief.111  While this phenomenon 
might arguably affect jurors as well, thus contributing to an increase 
in plaintiff success at trial, that matters only if cases actually make it to 
trial.  Many do not.112  And, again, a jury decides a case only after 
having been instructed in the law, generally with a warning from the 
judge that jurors must follow his instructions and not their own 
preconceived notions of what the law is or should be.113 
While the possibility that popular understandings of legal concepts 
will not map exactly onto their precise legal definition undoubtedly 
                                                          
 108. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 478 (“[F]ormal law and informal social norms are 
not mutually independent.  Social norms both shape and are shaped by formal 
law.”). 
 109. Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 9 
(2003). 
 110. See Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 257-58 (“Americans’ beliefs and 
expectations are shaped, in large part, by media portrayals.  If the media paints a 
distorted picture, Americans come to have a distorted view.”). 
 111. According to Nielsen and Beim: 
Ordinary workers who come to think of the anti-discrimination law system as 
a windfall for plaintiffs may come to have unrealistic expectations about what 
constitutes illegal workplace discrimination and their likelihood of winning 
(should they pursue a claim), as well as the remedy they are likely to obtain 
should they prevail.  These unrealistic expectations may be one of the many 
factors fueling increased claiming behavior in the last decade. 
Id. at 260.  Nielsen and Beim also note that notwithstanding this increase in claims, 
“it is still the case that the vast majority of employees who think they have been 
discriminated against in the workplace do not pursue a formal complaint either 
within the organization or with the appropriate state or federal agency.”  Id. at 261. 
 112. See, e.g., Symposium, Civil Rights Act, supra note 34, at 794 (“Summary 
judgment is routinely affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in cases where there are big 
factual issues.”). 
 113. For example, one jury instruction reads: 
My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law.  It is your duty to accept 
these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine 
them . . . . On these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to 
you. . . . You should not, any of you, be concerned about the wisdom of any 
rule that I state.  Regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the 
law may be—or ought to be—it would violate your sworn duty to base a 
verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you. 
4 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 71.02 (Release No. 
50A 2007). 
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exists throughout the law,114 the danger is even more pronounced in 
the context of hostile work environment claims involving sexual 
harassment.  As noted above, this is in part because courts often take 
meaningfully different approaches in deciding what constitutes 
sexual harassment.115  If the courts cannot agree, how are individual 
citizens supposed to know?  But there is an additional reason why this 
approach presents cause for special concern in the sexual harassment 
context.  Studies have shown that there is “a gender gap in the 
definition of sexual harassment.  In general, women have a broader, 
more inclusive definition of sexual harassment and are more likely 
than men to view mild social sexual behavior as sexual harassment.”116  
                                                          
 114. In considering whether to hold individuals responsible for knowing the 
relevant law, it is interesting to consider the very different field of qualified 
immunity.  The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from 
suits for damages unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an 
objectively reasonable official would have known.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 638 (1987).  In this context, courts have recognized that “it is inevitable that law 
enforcement officials will in some cases ‘reasonably but mistakenly’” believe that 
their actions are lawful.  Id. at 641.  Thus, “[t]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives 
ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law.’”  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).  
Law enforcement officials are accorded this room to make mistakes because “the 
public interest requires that public officials be able to carry out their discretionary 
duties and act decisively without the intimidation that would result if good-faith 
errors in judgment were later to subject them to liability for damages.”  Laverne v. 
Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1149 (2d Cir. 1975).  If we recognize that even law 
enforcement officials, who can reasonably be expected to know the law, will 
sometimes make mistakes, it makes sense to recognize that lay people will often make 
mistakes as well.  Some courts have accorded plaintiffs this same breathing room in 
the context of hostile work environment claims.  See Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 
612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The plaintiff here was an educated and 
informed layperson who should not be burdened with the sometimes impossible task 
of correctly anticipating how the Supreme Court may interpret a particular statute.”). 
 115. See supra Part II.A (discussing the difficulties of adequately defining sexual 
harassment). 
 116. Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in 
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases:  A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 607 (1999); see Abrams, supra note 94, at 1202 (“[M]en 
regard conduct, ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendo, differently than 
women do.”); Bernstein, supra note 99, at 465-66 (“In positing a genderless victim of 
sexual harassment, the reasonable person standard pushes under the rug an 
embarrassing mass of evidence indicating that gender affects the way men and 
women perceive sexual behavior in the workplace.  A reasonable person standard 
implicitly denies that women and men are likely to react differently to sexual 
invitations, innuendo, teasing, or displays in the workplace.  Yet empirical findings 
show that men are relatively likely to feel flattered or amused, whereas women are 
relatively likely to feel frightened or insulted, by sex-related behavior or displays at 
work.”) (footnote omitted); Nielsen & Beim, supra note 39, at 241 (“Research on the 
prevalence of discrimination in the workplace shows a striking disjuncture between 
the perceptions of white women and people of color in the workplace and those of 
their white [male] colleagues and supervisors.”); cf. Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:  
Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 529, 565-66 
(2003) (“Minorities are considerably more likely to perceive an event as 
discriminatory than are whites.”).  While some commentators have urged the 
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These studies not only support the idea that popular understandings 
of sexual harassment often differ from the legal definition, but they 
also suggest an additional reason not to employ the “reasonable 
juror” standard in determining what conduct is protected under Title 
VII.  After all, if women tend to have a broader view of what conduct 
constitutes sexual harassment, then women, one of the groups Title 
VII was intended to protect, will be most likely to get caught in the 
gap between what members of the public may view as reasonable and 
what the law does.117 
Indeed, as a result of the “reasonable juror” standard, women who 
report early will be unprotected from retaliation, and other women 
may wait to report harassing behavior until it occurs repeatedly and 
they feel comfortable that the conduct is such that a “reasonable 
juror” could find that it is unlawful under Title VII.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s approach—what I call the “repeated conduct” standard—
suffers from the same problem.  It requires the plaintiff to establish 
that it was reasonable for her to believe that the conduct would be 
repeated.118  In most cases, a woman cannot know whether the 
conduct will likely be repeated; thus, this standard effectively forces 
her to wait to complain until the co-worker repeats his actions if she 
wants her complaint to be protected.  Thus, both the “reasonable 
juror” and the “repeated conduct” standards deter reporting, and just 
as importantly, they deter early reporting.  As a result, they threaten 
to undercut many of the fundamental purposes underlying Title VII. 
                                                          
adoption of a reasonable woman standard to address this concern, such a standard is 
not without its own problems.  See Bernstein, supra note 99, at 471-77 (detailing the 
various arguments against a reasonable woman standard, and the difficulties in 
ascertaining what that standard means and how it can and should be applied). 
 117. Admittedly, one could adopt the position that even if members of the general 
public do not know the law in this area, they should know it, and adopting the 
“reasonable juror” standard will encourage acquisition of that knowledge.  But this 
may be an area in which widespread knowledge does more harm than good.  Do we 
want individuals who might consider harassing their co-workers to know that isolated 
comments will not subject them to liability?  Will that help to achieve Title VII’s 
objectives?  Even if we did want to encourage knowledge of the law, is there any 
reason to think that we should not allow for reasonable mistakes on the part of 
individuals who complain about discrimination?  And, perhaps most significantly, 
there is little reason to place the burden of acquiring knowledge on employees when 
we could place on employers the burden of educating their employees. 
 118. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., No. 05-1485, slip op. at 10 (4th Cir. May 12, 
2006), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 05-1485, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. 
July 5, 2006), affirmed on reh’g, 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 467 
F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2036 (2007). 
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B.  The Solution 
What then to do about it?  How can courts provide sufficient 
protection to employees without intruding on the legitimate 
decisionmaking prerogatives of employers?  While one solution might 
be to adopt a “reasonable woman” standard, it is questionable how 
effective such a solution would be.  A “reasonable woman” standard is 
hardly more concrete than any other “reasonableness” standard, and 
it is unlikely that courts will find it any easier to apply.  Moreover, 
according to one commentator: 
Because most judges are men, who have experienced the 
traditional forms of male socialization, their instinctive reaction is 
to accept the perspective of the employer. . . . [A] characteristically 
“male” view, which depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as 
a comparatively harmless amusement, or as the treatment women 
should expect when they push their way into the workplace, 
pervades many recent opinions.119 
Thus, it may be difficult for these male judges to understand what 
would be acceptable to the hypothetical “reasonable woman.”120  As a 
result, while such an approach might produce greater sensitivity to 
the problem, it is not at all clear that it would actually produce 
tangible results that would bring us closer to solving it. 
Surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan came close to 
providing an answer, at least a partial one.  One of the situations in 
which an individual is most likely to erroneously believe that she is 
the victim of sexual harassment, even though existing case law does 
not define the conduct she has experienced as such, is when she has 
experienced an isolated incident of relatively subtle harassment or 
sexual teasing.  Yet if there were repeated instances of such conduct, 
it is likely that they could rise to a level that would be “severe or 
pervasive” enough to alter the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s 
employment and thus constitute a “hostile work environment.”  In 
other words, if the Fourth Circuit had simply held that a plaintiff’s 
belief is reasonable if she experiences conduct that, if repeated, 
would constitute sexual harassment, it would have gone far toward 
creating a standard that can be applied with relative ease and would 
allow most plaintiffs to report harassing conduct early without fear 
                                                          
 119. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203. 
 120. Although juries will presumably be more gender-balanced than the federal 
judiciary, many cases will never make it to a jury.  In George v. Leavitt, for example, the 
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s retaliation claim on summary judgment, and 
the D.C. Circuit affirmed because “the incidents of which [the plaintiff] complained 
could not reasonably be thought to constitute an abusive working environment in 
violation of Title VII.”  407 F.3d 405, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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that they will fall outside of the anti-retaliation provision’s protective 
scope.  However, what the Fourth Circuit gave with one hand, it took 
away with the other.  Where the Fourth Circuit went astray was in 
requiring that plaintiffs be able to show that it was reasonable for 
them to believe that such conduct would recur.121  In many cases, if 
not most, plaintiffs will have no way of knowing whether such 
conduct is likely to be repeated.  And leaving to chance whether they 
will be subjected to future unwanted, embarrassing advances is 
neither a desirable outcome, nor one that will advance the goals of 
Title VII. 
Rather than placing the burden on plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit 
could have established an affirmative defense that would be available 
to defendants that could show that it was unreasonable for the 
plaintiff in a given case to believe that the conduct was likely to recur.  
In Jordan, the court noted that the racial epithets, as offensive and 
inappropriate as they were, constituted a heated, emotional response 
to a news report; in the lengthy time in which the plaintiff had 
worked there, they had not previously occurred.122  If the Fourth 
Circuit had established an affirmative defense, the defendant could 
have made these arguments to a jury and, had the jury accepted 
them, there would have been no liability.  While an affirmative 
defense does not spare a defendant the costs of litigation, it 
nonetheless represents a reasonable compromise between the need 
to provide broad protection to employees without unduly impeding 
on the personnel decisions of employers.  And, perhaps even more 
importantly, it represents a way to serve the goals of Title VII in the 
process of striking that compromise.  After all, even if the plaintiff 
loses at trial, getting to trial is itself significant because it helps to 
facilitate greater conversation about what types of workplace conduct 
are appropriate and allows those who believe they have been 
victimized to speak out in a public forum. 
The question then is whether such an approach goes far enough.  
Could situations arise in which an employee believes that an isolated 
incident is sexual harassment even though it would not, even if 
repeated, meet the requirements of sexual harassment law?  
Unfortunately, examples abound.  For example, a woman might 
believe it is harassment if a co-worker repeatedly asks her out on a 
date, but some courts—although by no means all—have suggested 
that romantic interest, no matter how often repeated, is never sexual 
                                                          
 121. Jordan, No. 05-1485, slip op. at 10. 
 122. Id. 
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harassment.123  Or a woman might think it is sexual harassment if she 
observes males harassing other women in the office, but this, too, has 
not been consistently treated as sexual harassment under the case 
law.124  There is no reason why these women are any less deserving of 
protection from retaliation for reporting conduct that they believe, 
albeit erroneously and perhaps not even reasonably by some 
measures, to be sexual harassment.  Thus, this approach, too, fails to 
provide sufficient protection to employees.   
While Judge King’s approach may not provide a sufficiently broad 
definition of “protected conduct” under the anti-retaliation 
provision, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan contains an 
additional lesson well worth considering.  One point, albeit implicit, 
on which both the majority and dissent agree is that, under at least 
some circumstances, a woman’s complaint should be protected even 
if the conduct she has thus far experienced cannot reasonably be 
viewed as sexual harassment, at least as defined by existing case law.  
What they disagree about is what those circumstances are, and 
indeed, that is hardly surprising.  The conflicting decisions in the 
sexual harassment case law about what crosses the line, the gap 
between the legal definition of sexual harassment and the public’s 
knowledge of that definition, and the discrepancies between men 
and women’s views as to what constitutes sexual harassment, all 
operate to make it virtually impossible to provide a comprehensive 
definition of what conduct would make a complainant’s views 
reasonable.  In other words, it is exceedingly difficult to determine 
                                                          
 123. Compare O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, No. 01-7807, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14446 (2d Cir. July 16, 
2002) (“Plaintiff has presented evidence that while Rosen was both a co-employee 
and her supervisor, he repeatedly asked her out.  Rosen made comments about her 
appearance, sent her e-mails professing his love for her, called her at work and at 
home, invited her to tour New York City with him, gave her three gifts, and played 
her a song that she found offensive.  This conduct, however pervasive, was not 
sufficiently severe as to alter the conditions of her employment . . . .”) (citation 
omitted), with Osorio v. Source Enters., No. 05 Civ. 10029 (JSR), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 63032, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (“Although defendants argue, rather 
improbably, that these expressions of ‘romantic interest’ do not constitute 
harassment, their counsel’s professed inability . . . to distinguish between romantic 
interest and sexual harassment speaks more to counsel’s unworldliness than to any 
realistic defense.”) (citations omitted). 
 124. See Christopher M. O’Connor, Stop Harassing Her or We’ll Both Sue:  Bystander 
Injury Sexual Harassment, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 537 (1991) (describing sexual 
harassment claims brought by those who were not targeted as being in their 
“infancy”); cf. Robert A. Kearney, The Unintended Hostile Environment:  Mapping the 
Limits of Sexual Harassment Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 88 (2004) 
(describing a hypothetical woman who “believes she is the victim of sexual 
harassment because her work environment is filled with sexual innuendo and 
vulgarity,” but whose “claim may be doomed before it even gets started” because the 
harassment was not “because of sex”). 
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what beliefs are reasonable because beliefs about harassment are too 
contextual and individual, and the law on sexual harassment is too 
undefined and little-known. 
It is unlikely then that the best solution is to try to craft some 
intricate definition of what will satisfy the “reasonableness” 
requirement; any attempt will likely provide too little guidance to 
district courts or be insufficiently comprehensive.  Instead, the best 
solution may be to abandon altogether the requirement that a 
plaintiff establish that her belief was reasonable.  Certainly, there is 
no reason that every complaint, even ones made in bad faith, should 
be protected; to offer protection that broad would hardly serve the 
purposes of Title VII.  But limiting protection to those complaints 
that are reasonable does not serve Title VII’s purposes either.  
Although this requirement is designed to offer some protection to 
employers,125 an employer’s most significant protection against a 
retaliation claim is that he can always fire someone so long as the 
complaint was not the cause.  The anti-retaliation provision does not 
make an employee who files a complaint immune from termination; 
it only means that the employer cannot fire her because she filed the 
complaint.126  Consequently, an employer will not be held liable if he 
can establish that there was some lawful reason for the decision to 
fire the plaintiff.127 
Courts could simply reframe the “reasonableness” requirement.  
Instead of requiring a plaintiff to prove that her belief was 
reasonable, courts could establish an affirmative defense to liability 
that would place the burden on the employer to establish that the 
plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable.  Unfortunately, such an approach 
is unlikely to provide sufficient protection to the victims of retaliation 
because simply shifting the burden, in theory, does not change the 
realities that make it difficult for plaintiffs to establish that their 
beliefs are reasonable.  There will still be a gap between the case law 
and public perceptions; there will still be differences in the way 
sexual harassment cases are resolved; and there will still be 
differences in the ways men and women perceive harassing behavior.  
                                                          
 125. Chambliss, supra note 11, at 21 (“Title VII . . . seeks to minimize economic 
disruption, and opposition by employees obviously has the potential to be both costly 
and disruptive for employers.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271-72 (2001) (per 
curiam) (analyzing the temporal relationship between the alleged retaliation and the 
time the complaint was filed). 
 127. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining 
that once the plaintiff has made a valid claim, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for termination). 
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The burden may shift, but defendant employers will still be able to 
point to all of these factors, and courts will likely continue to find that 
the plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable.  Thus, the tangible effect of 
shifting the burden may be modest. 
Courts could try to craft a stronger burden, requiring employers to 
put forward specific evidence that it was unreasonable for an 
individual in the plaintiff’s position to believe that the conduct 
complained of was unlawful, but this approach is not without its 
practical limitations.  First, it is difficult to know what exactly this 
approach would require of employers or how it would play out in 
practice.  Perhaps if an employer regularly held employee trainings 
on sexual harassment with materials that accurately described the 
current state of sexual harassment law and ensured that employees 
participated in those trainings, those actions might be sufficient to 
establish that the plaintiff should have known that her belief was 
unreasonable.  Alternatively, if the employer could establish that the 
plaintiff filed repeated complaints after going through an 
investigation process that apprised her of what conduct violates Title 
VII, that showing might also prove sufficient to meet the employer’s 
burden. 
But there is a real danger that no matter how much courts 
required of employers in theory, they would require little in practice.  
As discussed at greater length below, the Supreme Court has 
established that, under some circumstances, an employer can avoid 
vicarious liability for sexual harassment by establishing that it 
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior” and that the plaintiff failed to take 
advantage of those opportunities.128 This requirement has been the 
focus of much criticism because courts 
are interpreting “reasonable care” in the first prong of the new 
affirmative defense to require only minimal prevention efforts by 
the employer.  For example, some courts have held that the mere 
promulgation of a policy, without any effective enforcement 
mechanism, is enough to meet the employer’s burden of 
reasonable care under prong one of the affirmative defense.129 
There is a real danger that an affirmative defense in this context 
would suffer the same fate.  In theory, it would encourage employers 
to go to greater lengths to educate their workers, but in practice, 
                                                          
 128. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 129. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment:  The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call 
for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002). 
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courts would simply rubber-stamp “paper policies” and use them to 
justify the dismissal of retaliation claims.130 
Second, there is a more fundamental problem with reframing the 
“reasonableness” requirement as an affirmative defense.  No matter 
who has the burden of establishing whether the plaintiff’s belief was 
reasonable, the requirement itself necessitates a baseline against 
which the plaintiff’s belief may be measured and, thus, assumes the 
reasonableness of that baseline.  Yet that baseline may reflect 
antedated notions and stereotypes about women, or male notions 
about what is acceptable behavior in the workplace, and the anti-
retaliation provision, properly construed, should allow women to 
speak out and challenge those ideas without fear of retaliation.  If a 
woman cannot speak out without fear of retaliation simply because 
her employer has educated her about the existing case law, then she 
is largely stripped of her ability to challenge that case law. 
Thus, reframing the “reasonableness” requirement is not enough.  
Instead, courts should reject the “reasonableness” requirement 
altogether and recognize that employers have no right to fire an 
employee, or otherwise retaliate against her, simply because she has 
made a good faith effort to assert her rights under Title VII.  Under 
this approach, a plaintiff’s complaint would be protected unless the 
employer can prove that it was made in bad faith.  This approach will 
be considerably easier for courts to apply, and for litigants to 
understand, than the current “reasonableness” standard.  In a 
context in which it is critical that individuals be able to know ex ante 
whether their conduct will be protected, a test that is easier to apply 
and more protective of employee rights offers many advantages over 
the current standard.131  Moreover, because this approach would 
                                                          
 130. The doctrine’s emphasis on training and educational programs has also 
endured significant criticism because there is little evidence that such tools have 
been effective in creating meaningful change in the workplace.  See, e.g., Susan 
Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure:  Confronting 
the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) (chronicling training efforts taken by 
employers and considering the negative effects of such efforts); Joanna L. Grossman, 
The Culture of Compliance:  The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (noting that “the rules of employer liability 
for harassment are calculated to ensure that employers adopt basic policies and 
procedures with respect to workplace harassment, not, surprisingly, to ensure that 
they actually prevent it”); id. (“[T]here is little evidence in the vast social science 
literature to support this emphasis on rule compliance.  In fact, cookie-cutter sexual 
harassment policies and procedures do not seem to have any reliably negative effect 
on the incidence of harassment.”). 
 131. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) 
(discussing the relative pros and cons of rules and standards in different areas of 
constitutional law). 
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focus less on the plaintiff’s beliefs about the state of the law and more 
on whether she was acting in good faith when she filed the 
complaint, it would better reflect the purposes of the anti-retaliation 
provision, namely, to protect those individuals who are trying to 
protect their rights under Title VII.132 
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE NEW PARADIGM 
That the courts’ current approach does not strike the best balance 
becomes all the more clear when one considers the substantial 
benefits a broader interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision 
offers.  Courts and commentators alike have recognized the critical 
role that private complaints about discrimination and harassment 
play in enforcement of Title VII.133  To some extent, this role is 
obvious—if individuals do not report harassment, past conduct will 
not be punished.  And this role is particularly important in the 
context of Title VII enforcement given the EEOC’s relatively limited 
role in enforcing Title VII’s protections.134 
                                                          
 132. In some respects, this approach might provide a broader defense against 
retaliation claims than is currently available to employers.  Consider this example:  
An employee experiences clear sexual harassment for a sustained period of time, but 
never files a complaint.  Then, recognizing that she is about to be fired for some 
unrelated reason, she files a complaint solely so she can bring a retaliation claim 
after she is fired.  Under the current test, this bad faith arguably provides the 
employer no defense so long as the plaintiff reasonably believed that the conduct was 
unlawful; however, under the alternative this Article advances, the employer could 
argue that the complaint was made in bad faith, and if the jury accepted this 
argument, the employer would not face liability for retaliation.  See, e.g., Monteiro v. 
Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that a complaint under Title 
VII may not be “raised as a smokescreen in challenge to the supervisor’s legitimate 
criticism”).   
 Although this presents some risk that employees might be penalized for waiting 
too long to complain, the employer would still have to prove that the delay was not 
the result of fear or confusion; he would have to prove that the plaintiff was acting in 
bad faith.  Moreover, the law already makes it risky for employees to wait too long to 
report harassment.  See infra Part III.A. 
 133. As one commentator has noted, if individuals do not report violations of the 
Act, “[g]overnment agencies [will not adequately] fill the enforcement gap.  The 
agencies with employment law responsibilities have limited resources.”  Hodges, 
supra note 33, at 609; see Jolls, supra note 48, at 146 (“[T]he government is limited in 
its ability to provide direct legal representation for employees, both as a matter of 
theory and as an empirical matter.”).  
 134. Unlike some administrative agencies that play an active role in enforcing the 
statute they are charged with enforcing, the EEOC lacks the power of enforcement.  
See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(“While it can subpoena witnesses, hold hearings, and attempt conciliation, it has no 
authority to issue orders or compel enforcement.  More than that, except [in limited 
situations] . . . , [the] Government does not enter the litigation.  The suit is between 
private parties.  The burden of enforcement rests on the individual through his suit 
in Federal District Court.”); see also Marshall, supra note 13, at 73-74 (“In practice, if 
not by design, Title VII places the initial burden of enforcing its substantive 
provisions upon the individual victims of workplace discrimination.  Although the 
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But Title VII serves many purposes, and its anti-retaliation 
provision, if interpreted with the appropriate breadth, can serve 
those other purposes as well.  The approach this Article 
advances⎯namely, rejecting the “reasonableness” requirement⎯will 
enable the anti-retaliation provision to serve these purposes by 
encouraging women to report harassment and, just as importantly, to 
report it early.  Early reporting is important not only because it can 
help prevent additional harassment, but also because it is an 
important means to achieve other valuable ends. 
Early reporting can facilitate conciliation and informal resolution 
of harassment claims, thereby avoiding the costs, monetary and 
otherwise, that litigation imposes.  Early reporting also enables 
harassment victims to ameliorate the psychological and dignitary 
harms that harassment causes.  And, perhaps most importantly, early 
reporting makes it easier to challenge and change the gender norms 
and stereotypes that continue to pervade the workplace. 
A. Preventing Harm 
The Supreme Court has recognized the important prophylactic 
role of Title VII enforcement, explaining that its “‘primary 
objective[]’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary 
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”135  To achieve 
that end, the Supreme Court has encouraged individuals to report 
discrimination and to report it early.136  In fact, the Supreme Court 
has done more than simply encourage individuals to report 
discriminatory conduct; it has made such reporting a precondition to 
employer liability.137 
The Court first gave the issue of employer liability sustained 
attention in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,138 in which the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisors “repeatedly subject[ed] [her] . . . to 
‘uninvited and offensive touching,’ by making lewd remarks, and by 
speaking of women in offensive terms.”  The plaintiff sued not only 
her supervisors, but also her employer.139  The Supreme Court noted 
that courts had universally taken the view that employers should be 
                                                          
[EEOC] has the authority to investigate and commence claims on its own initiative, it 
does so with pronounced infrequency.”) (footnote omitted). 
 135. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). 
 136. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
 137. See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme 
Court’s decision to allow employers an affirmative defense if the employee 
unreasonably fails to invoke the employer’s remedial procedures). 
 138. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 139. Id. at 780. 
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held liable where “discriminatory employment actions [had] tangible 
results, like hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work 
assignment.”140  Additionally, numerous cases in the courts of appeals 
and district courts had held employers liable “on account of actual 
knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials of an employer 
organization, of sufficiently harassing action by subordinates, which 
the employer or its informed officers have done nothing to stop.”141 
The Court then turned to agency law to consider why “harassing 
behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor’s 
employment, and the reasons for the opposite view.”142  The Court 
rejected the view that employers should always be held liable for the 
harassing behavior of their supervisors because such a view was 
unsupportable under traditional agency law, and it would almost 
certainly mean making employers liable for the harassing acts of co-
workers as well.143  The Court did, however, hold that “it makes sense 
to hold an employer vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a 
supervisor” when that conduct was “made possible by abuse of his 
supervisory authority.”144  It then sought a limiting principle, noting 
that “there is a sense in which a harassing supervisor is always assisted 
in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship.”145  The Court 
ultimately held that “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken, 
a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense.”146  In those 
cases, an employer could avoid liability if he could establish that he 
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior,” and that “the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”147  The Court explained: 
Although Title VII seeks “to make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,” its 
“primary objective” . . . is not to provide redress but to avoid 
harm. . . . It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and 
complement the Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to 
recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent 
                                                          
 140. Id. at 790. 
 141. Id. at 789. 
 142. Id. at 797. 
 143. Id. at 798-800. 
 144. Id. at 802. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 807. 
 147. Id. 
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violations and give credit here to employers who make reasonable 
efforts to discharge their duty.148 
This affirmative defense created a two-way street, placing a burden 
not only on the employer, but also on the employee.149  The Court 
likened the requirement that an employee avail herself of available 
complaint mechanisms to the general mitigation principles under the 
law of damages.150  Thus, “[i]f the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail 
herself of the employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she 
should not recover damages that could have been avoided if she had 
done so.”151  In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,152 decided the same 
day as Faragher, the Court reaffirmed that “encourag[ing] employees 
to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive . . . 
would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”153 
The Supreme Court’s language could not be clearer.  Employees 
should report sexual harassment not only early, but before it is even 
harassment.  But under the “reasonableness” standard, particularly as 
interpreted by the D.C. and Fourth Circuits, a plaintiff cannot report 
too early, lest a court determine that she could not have reasonably 
believed that the conduct about which she was complaining was 
unlawful.  It truly is a frustrating “Catch-22” situation⎯report too 
early, and the behavior is not harassment, but wait too long, and 
there is little point in reporting because the employer may no longer 
be held liable.  Indeed, several courts have been unwilling to excuse 
plaintiffs’ failure to report their complaints based on their claim that 
they feared doing so might subject them to retaliation.154  And other 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 805-06 (internal citation omitted). 
 149. In fact, Ellerth and Faragher have been criticized for “creat[ing] a legal rule 
that from its inception was unlikely to promote the stated goal of prevention” by 
“hinging liability on a response to harassment that is uncommon,” that is, formal 
reporting of sexual harassment.  Lawton, Operating, supra note 94, at 198. 
 150. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
 151. Id. at 805-07.  Anne Lawton argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Faragher 
shift[ed] the focus from the organizational employer to the individual 
harasser. . . . [which] in turn, affects the framing of the liability rules:  
employers are rewarded for promulgating paper policies and procedures, 
not for addressing the more difficult organizational causes of sexual 
harassment.  Thus, employers generally need do nothing but wait for victims 
to report.  The resulting liability scheme makes the victims of harassment 
shoulder much of the burden for eliminating workplace harassment and 
undermines what the Court considers to be Title VII’s primary purpose—the 
deterrence of workplace discrimination. 
Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 40, at 836-37 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 152. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 153. Id. at 764. 
 154. See West, supra note 129, at 479-86 (highlighting case law to show that “vague 
and subjective fears do not justify a failure to complain”); see also Ann M. Henry, 
Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under the 
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courts have required victims “to produce hard-to-find evidence of 
specific facts justifying any failure on their part to complain to 
employers . . . [thereby placing on] victims of sexual harassment . . . a 
heavy production burden to justify a failure to file an internal 
complaint.”155 
Thus, the “reasonableness” requirement creates a significant 
tension in the case law’s treatment of Title VII reporting.  By 
rejecting the “reasonableness” requirement, it will be much easier for 
employees to complain early without fear that they will have no legal 
recourse if they then become the victims of retaliation.  As a result, it 
will be easier to achieve the purpose that the Supreme Court has 
identified as one of Title VII’s most important:  the prevention of 
harm. 
B. Informal Resolution 
Early reporting is beneficial not only because it helps to prevent 
harm, but also because it allows the employer and employee to 
address problems before the conduct is so entrenched and the 
relationship so damaged that it is difficult to address the situation in 
an informal manner.  The statute itself prioritizes informal resolution 
of Title VII claims, providing that if the EEOC “determines . . . that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that [a] charge is true, [it] shall 
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.”156  Indeed, the very existence of the opposition clause 
suggests Congress’ interest in promoting informal, internal 
                                                          
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553, 563 (1999) (“Several 
courts applying the new affirmative defense have concluded that the employee acted 
unreasonably when failing to complain of harassing behavior out of fear of 
retaliation.”). 
 155. West, supra note 129, at 461.  West notes that “federal courts are applying the 
[Ellerth/Faragher] affirmative defense without any examination of women’s reluctance 
to complain because of fear of reprisal.”  Id.  West’s proposed solution is “requir[ing] 
an employer to demonstrate the effectiveness of its prevention policy by 
documenting for employees the actions it took in addressing prior sexual harassment 
complaints.”  Id. at 497. 
 Courts have not yet determined whether it is appropriate to consider an 
employer’s own policies in determining whether a plaintiff’s belief that she was the 
victim of unlawful discrimination is reasonable.  If courts do not consider such 
materials, then a greater proliferation of materials that often (wisely) describe sexual 
harassment in liberal terms could paradoxically result in more women making 
complaints that are unprotected under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.  West 
also argues that “[p]ublic education is necessary to tell women about the federal 
courts’ new legal requirement that women must complain before filing suit.  At a 
minimum, plaintiffs’ attorneys must educate women clients about the need to tell the 
employer about the harassment before filing suit.”  Id. at 522. 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000). 
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resolution of disputes under Title VII.157  The Supreme Court, too, 
has noted that it was “Congress’ intention to promote conciliation 
rather than litigation in the Title VII context,”158 and that 
“[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the 
preferred means for achieving” Title VII’s goals.159 
Another benefit of abandoning reasonableness as a prima facie 
element of a plaintiff’s retaliation claim is that it will encourage 
individuals to file informal complaints with their employers rather 
than turning immediately to the EEOC.  Why is this so?  Under the 
current framework, a plaintiff who “unreasonably” opposes a practice 
made unlawful under Title VII receives no protection under the 
statute.  However, if the plaintiff had skipped the informal complaint 
and immediately “made a charge” with the EEOC, her conduct would 
likely have been protected, no matter how unreasonable.  The 
Supreme Court suggested as much in Clark County.160  In that case, as 
discussed earlier, the plaintiff alleged that her employer retaliated 
against her for complaining about conduct that the Supreme Court 
held she could not have reasonably believed was sexual harassment.161  
However, she not only complained, but also “fil[ed] charges against 
[her employer] with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),” and she 
alleged that her employer retaliated against her for filing those 
charges and the lawsuit.162  Having already held that the plaintiff 
could not have reasonably believed that the underlying conduct was 
unlawful, one might have expected the Supreme Court to dismiss all 
of her retaliation claims.  It did not, however.  Instead, it went on to 
consider whether the plaintiff’s filing of the charges was the cause of 
her termination.163  If the Court had determined that her employer 
did fire her because she filed those charges, she would have prevailed 
on her retaliation claim, even though she would not have prevailed 
had she simply filed an informal, internal complaint with her 
employer. 
Several courts of appeals have adopted a similarly broad approach 
in protecting individuals who file charges with the EEOC.  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit has held that a charge filed with the EEOC 
is protected even if it contains “malicious material,” so long as “the 
                                                          
 157. Chambliss, supra note 11, at 21. 
 158. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
 159. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
 160. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
 161. Id. at 270. 
 162. Id. at 271. 
 163. Id. at 271-72. 
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charge otherwise satisfies the liberal requirements of a charge.”164  
The Fourth Circuit has also held that “[r]eading a reasonableness test 
into section 704(a)’s participation clause would . . . undermine the 
objectives of Title VII. . . . A straightforward reading of the statute’s 
unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all 
testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive 
employer action.”165 
The discrepancy between the protection afforded under the two 
provisions led the Ninth Circuit to warn that “[a]ccusations made in 
the context of charges before the Commission are protected by 
statute; charges made outside of that context are made at the 
accuser’s peril.”166  Commentators have also noted that the greater 
protections afforded by the “participation” clause should give 
employees pause before “participating in their employer’s internal 
investigations.”167  An employee who knows that she may be 
unprotected for lodging an informal complaint, but who knows that 
filing a formal charge with the EEOC will accord her complete 
protection, will likely do the latter.  Thus, the “reasonableness” 
requirement, especially when reasonableness is defined as narrowly as 
it is by the D.C. and Fourth Circuits’ standards, encourages 
individuals to file a charge with the EEOC without first notifying their 
employers of the problem.168 
                                                          
 164. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969).  The 
court explained that the case presented competing interests.  “On the one hand is 
the protection of the employer from damage caused by maliciously libelous 
statements and on the other is protection of the employee from racial and other 
discrimination.”  Id.  It also noted that 
 [i]n Title VII Congress sought to protect the employer’s interest by 
directing that EEOC proceedings be confidential and by imposing severe 
sanctions against unauthorized disclosure.  The balance is therefore struck 
in favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated protection 
from invidious discrimination, by protecting his right to file charges. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 165. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 166. Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 167. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1184. 
 168. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(noting that interpreting the protections of the “opposition” clause too narrowly 
“would not only chill the legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but 
would tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek conciliation or 
informal adjustment of grievances”); see also Henry, supra note 154, at 571 (“[C]ourts 
should interpret Title VII’s retaliation provisions liberally so that employees feel they 
can follow Ellerth and Faragher’s instruction to use internal complaint procedures 
without making themselves targets for retaliation.”).   
 At least one commentator has argued that the affirmative defense established in 
Faragher and Ellerth does not provide employees with the option of going first to the 
EEOC.  She explains that “[i]f the employee does not complain internally first, the 
employer gains the protection of part (b) of the defense and potentially avoids 
liability for the acts of its supervisors.”  Larkin, supra note 53, at 1210.  It is unclear 
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Yet it is by filing internal complaints with their employers that 
employees can most easily set in motion informal methods of 
resolving their claims of discrimination.  Multiple commentators have 
extolled the benefits of informal resolution of Title VII claims,169 
noting that all involved in sexual harassment claims seek a quick 
resolution to the dispute.170  Dorothy Larkin, for example, has argued 
that encouraging employees to bypass internal complaint 
mechanisms is troubling for two primary reasons.  “First, resolving an 
incident internally is often more efficient.  Internal grievance 
procedures are cheaper, faster, and more informal.”171  Because these 
processes are often quicker and more informal than litigation, they 
offer the additional benefit that the parties may be able to resolve 
their claims without doing additional damage to their relationships.  
Such a result is much less likely after the adversarial litigation process 
has been initiated.  Moreover, informal resolution may facilitate more 
of a conversation about the behavior and why the plaintiff found it 
offensive; this conversation may lead all parties to a greater 
appreciation of each other and a better understanding of what is 
acceptable workplace behavior.  Such a conversation is also less likely 
to occur in the context of formal litigation. 
The second disadvantage Larkin identifies in formal resolution 
mechanisms is that the “EEOC budget cuts have diminished the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the charging procedures.”172  As Larkin 
notes, these budget cuts came at the same time that the jurisdiction 
of the EEOC was expanded with the enactment of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.173  These budget cuts 
have impaired the ability of the EEOC to process these claims, 
resulting in longer delays for those waiting for the EEOC to evaluate 
                                                          
that this is true, however, because the affirmative defense requires only that plaintiffs 
notify their employer or otherwise mitigate their harm. 
 169. Yelnosky, supra note 38, at 598-99.  Admittedly, there are drawbacks to 
informal, private resolution of Title VII claims, see, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses 
and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 482, 524 (1987) (asking “Whether informal dispute resolution interferes with the 
eradication of discrimination. . . .  [because] the focus on resolving individual 
controversies [might] pose the danger of clouding a pervasive picture of 
discrimination?”), but what is important for present purposes is that harassment 
victims feel comfortable pursuing their claims informally if they so choose.  Informal 
resolution is almost certainly better than no resolution at all. 
 170. Bond, supra note 31, at 2501. 
 171. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1186. 
 172. Id.  Larkin proposes that courts extend “participation” clause protection to 
employees who participate in an internal investigation, regardless of whether or not a 
formal charge has been filed with the EEOC.  Id. at 1206-11.  Even if courts were to 
adopt this approach, it would not necessarily protect plaintiffs who simply file 
internal complaints with their employer. 
 173. Id. at 1215. 
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their claims.  In the meantime, the resolution of claims hangs in the 
balance; and as time passes, memories fade, and it may be more 
difficult to achieve real justice at the end of the day.174  Moreover, if 
the EEOC must investigate claims brought by individuals afraid to 
complain to their employer, it will expend resources on many claims 
that may ultimately turn out to be frivolous.  Given the cuts to the 
EEOC’s budget and its significant backlog,175 the EEOC has no 
resources to waste, and the time and energy devoted to investigating 
these claims will necessarily detract from the time available to 
investigate more serious charges.176 
But it need not be this way.  The language of the anti-retaliation 
provision suggests no reason to impose a “reasonableness” 
requirement on claims brought under one clause and not the other.  
If plaintiffs are not required to establish that their beliefs are 
reasonable, this gap in the amount of protection afforded under the 
two clauses will be significantly eliminated, and individuals will be 
much more likely to seek informal resolution of their Title VII claims. 
C.  Ameliorating Harm 
Reporting violations of Title VII is important not only because it 
allows for the punishment of those who committed the wrong, but 
also because it is a step in the healing process for those who have 
been victimized.177  As many commentators have noted, one of the 
primary harms of sexual harassment is the harm to the dignity and 
self-respect of those it victimizes.178  This dignitary harm inheres in 
workplace harassment, no matter its source or method.179  As one 
commentator has noted: 
 [B]y humiliating, intimidating, tormenting, pressuring, or 
mocking individuals in their places of work, sexual harassment is 
an insult to the dignity, autonomy, and personhood of each victim; 
                                                          
 174. Id. 
 175. Bond, supra note 31, at 2490 (noting that the EEOC then had a backlog of 
80,000 cases). 
 176. Larkin, supra note 53, at 1216. 
 177. Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154-55. 
 178. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 98, at 260 (explaining that in continental 
Europe harassment in the workplace, sexual or non-sexual, is seen as a dignitary 
harm); Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 16 (noting that “[t]he harm of workplace 
sexual harassment is a dignitary harm”). 
 179. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 25 (“[T]he application of tort conceptions 
of ‘dignity’ to workplace harassment rests not on an argument that courts should 
adopt a particular conception of human dignity and personality, but instead rests on 
a recognition that courts simply do assume that human beings have a certain 
inherent dignity and that this dignity may not be violated, either by the state or by 
other private individuals.”). 
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such harassment violates each individual’s right to be treated with 
the respect and concern that is due to her as a full and equally 
valuable human being.180 
Title VII doctrine has been criticized for being insufficiently 
attentive to these aspects of the harm of harassment.  As one scholar 
explained, “The neglect or discounting of emotion—an inevitable 
effect when reason is the legal standard—not only mischaracterizes 
the experience of sexual harassment but also cheapens the measure 
of the plaintiff’s damage.”181 
The fact that the workplace is the setting for this mocking and 
tormenting may also compound the psychological harm, in part 
because it affects the victim’s sense of both personal and professional 
self-worth.182  One commentator maintained that “[s]exual 
harassment at work has a public, communal dimension, even when 
the offending behavior takes place behind a closed door.  Being 
humiliated at work can diminish settled beliefs about one’s 
competence and relative status vis-à-vis other workers.”183  Another 
commentator has explained the significance of the workplace in 
exacerbating the harms of harassment as follows:  “[O]ne’s life takes 
on publicly intelligible meaning largely through participation in 
market work.  The job not only constitutes one’s chief claim to 
wealth, but is also the prime determinant of one’s status.”184 
The fact that women are often “comparative newcomers to many 
kinds of work” may only compound these feelings of embarrassment 
and humiliation when they are harassed in the workplace.185  As 
Kathryn Abrams has explained, “[M]any women view their position in 
the workplace as marginal or precarious.  They are likely to construe 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 16; see Bernstein, supra note 99, at 450 (describing hostile environment 
sexual harassment as “a type of incivility or . . . disrespect”).  Richard Posner, too, has 
noted that “[i]t is possible that the economic costs of sex discrimination law are 
offset by gains not measured in an economic analysis—gains in self-esteem, for 
example.”  Posner, supra note 24, at 1335. 
 181. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 462. 
 182. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for 
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000) 
(explaining that workplace bullying may lead to psychological effects such as 
depression and low self-esteem); see also Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (noting that 
victims of sexual harassment may have “lowered satisfaction with one’s job and one’s 
life”). 
 183. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 490-91. 
 184. Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century’s End:  
Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 108 (1999); see 
Estlund, supra note 25, at 73 (“Expression[s] of hatred, contempt, or disrespect on 
the basis of race, sex, religion, or the like may inflict greater harm within the 
workplace than in the public square partly because of the close and ongoing 
personal engagement that the workplace compels.”). 
 185. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1204. 
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disturbing personal interactions, stereotypical views of women, or 
other affronts to their competence as workers as serious judgments 
about their ability to succeed in the work environment.”186 The fact 
that this mocking and humiliation may be part of a more general 
environment of sex discrimination may compound these feelings.  
While awareness of the discriminatory context may alleviate the 
psychological harm to some victims,187 it may make it worse for others.  
“[S]he may feel doubly undermined and attacked, both as an 
individual and as a woman.  Her suffering may be compounded if she 
feels trapped—condemned always to be targeted for an attribute she 
cannot change.”188 
Unsurprisingly then, many commentators report the serious effect 
that sexual harassment may have on its victims.189  Sexual harassment 
harms its victims “psychologically, physically, and financially,”190 
producing “serious, even devastating, effects.”191  One commentator 
has gone so far as to liken it to “a form of psychological pollution that 
corrodes the well-being of . . . [its] victims.”192  Thus, many employees 
who believe they have been the targets of sexual harassment will 
report the behavior not only because they want to bring it to an end, 
but because the very act of reporting is an effort to regain some 
                                                          
 186. Id. at 1205; see James C. Chow, Comment, Sticks, Stones, and Simple Teasing:  
The Jurisprudence of Non-Cognizable Harassing Conduct in the Context of Title VII Hostile 
Work Environment Claims, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 144 (1999) (arguing that even 
“stray remarks” can “undermine the competence of women”); John J. Donohue III, 
Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1583, 1610 (1992) [hereinafter Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis] (stating that “the 
heart of sexual harassment is the violation of personal autonomy”). 
 187. Rosa Ehrenreich explains this phenomenon: 
 [H]er awareness of having been targeted for discriminatory reasons may . . . 
diminish her individual suffering, because she may feel better able to brush 
off the harassment precisely because she knows that nothing she did or 
could have done would have prevented it; she may feel empowered by her 
awareness that she is integral to a broader struggle to demand that all 
women be treated as full persons. 
Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 19-20. 
 188. Id. at 19. 
 189. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (discussing the many harms that result 
from sexual harassment including negative side effects in one’s private and 
professional life); Yamada, supra note 182, at 483 (discussing the various 
psychological and physical effects of workplace harassment, including “stress, 
depression, mood swings, loss of sleep (and resulting fatigue), and feelings of shame, 
guilt, embarrassment, and low self-esteem”). 
 190. Bond, supra note 31, at 2499. 
 191. Yamada, supra note 182, at 483.  According to Yamada,  “workplace bullying,” 
a concept much broader than sexual harassment, is so damaging to both its victims 
and business as a whole that he has advocated the adoption of a status-blind hostile 
work environment protection.  Id. at 523-29. 
 192. Donohue, Advocacy Versus Analysis, supra note 186, at 1588. 
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control over the situation and to reclaim some of the dignity that they 
have lost.193 
Terry Smith has noted the “psychological and physical injury” that 
discrimination causes, and has suggested “that opposition conduct is 
both a symptom of these injuries and a self-defense to avoid 
continued harm.”194  While Smith’s work focuses on racial 
discrimination and discusses how it often engenders in its victims 
antagonistic feelings toward society,195 there is reason to think that 
women would experience similar feelings of outrage and frustration 
when confronted with sexual harassment.  Moreover, like minorities 
who find themselves without a support system at work to help 
alleviate the stress,196 women may also feel very much alone.  As Smith 
has noted, “the failure to engage in some form of opposition 
conduct—that is, the internalization of anger over perceived 
racism—threatens greater injury.”197 
Perhaps in response to concerns of this kind, continental Europe 
“appears increasingly to view harassment as an issue primarily of 
dignity rather than discrimination.”198 One commentator has 
suggested that “[t]he broad European enactment of anti-harassment 
protection in recent months and years . . . may represent a . . . 
decisive attempt to replace modern expressions of duelling with the 
rule of law.”199  The same commentator has questioned whether 
“[t]he annual American toll of workplace homicides and assaults . . . , 
even clinical depression and drug abuse, might be seen as a 
manifestation of these contemporary forms of ‘self-help’” in a society 
whose legal system is not sufficiently concerned with respect and 
dignitary harms.200  While this expression of concern may appear to 
over-dramatize the problem, it may be more right than many would 
want to believe.  The pervasiveness of sexual harassment is well-
                                                          
 193. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 19-20 (noting that when a woman knows 
she is being discriminated against, her knowledge of the situation may compel her to 
recover not only her dignity, but the dignity of all women). 
 194. Smith, supra note 116, at 546; see id. at 548 (“Although the Harvard-Kaiser 
Foundation study is significant for its verification that discrimination causes actual 
injury, it also suggests that opposition conduct is necessary to prevent or reduce the 
injury.”). 
 195. See id. at 549 (explaining that the “bitterness and anger” which results from 
racial discrimination is felt not only by the discriminating individual, but by society as 
a whole). 
 196. See id. (referencing a study which found that an African-American employee 
who works in a non-racially diverse environment lacks social support to cope with 
stress). 
 197. Id. at 566. 
 198. Coleman, supra note 98, at 260. 
 199. Id. at 287. 
 200. Id. 
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established,201 and if women come to believe that they cannot speak 
out about this harassment—that they cannot give voice to their 
feelings of frustration, anger, and fear—it seems reasonable to 
believe that those feelings, borne of the initial harassment but 
compounded by the forced silence, will manifest themselves in other, 
potentially destructive, ways. 
Again, the “reasonableness” requirement, especially as interpreted 
by the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, makes it more difficult for victims to 
speak out and give voice to those feelings of frustration and sadness 
and anger.  Moreover, for those victims who do speak out, the 
current state of the doctrine risks inflicting additional psychological 
injury by describing as unreasonable the victim’s perceptions of what 
she experienced and her feelings about it.  Eliminating the 
requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of establishing that 
her belief was reasonable eliminates the suggestion, implicit in the 
current doctrine, that the plaintiff’s feelings are not legitimate until 
she can prove that they are accepted by society.  Thus, this proposed 
alternative not only helps prevent additional wrongs by encouraging 
early reporting, but also does much to help the victims of workplace 
discrimination and harassment recover from the wrongs they have 
already experienced. 
D. Changing Norms 
Of course, the most significant, and most challenging, goal of Title 
VII is not ameliorating the harms of harassment, or even responding 
soon after it begins.  Title VII’s greatest triumph would be realized if 
it could actually affect broader change in workplaces around the 
country by helping to create workplace environments in which both 
men and women feel equally comfortable, and in which women feel 
that they are treated like, and respected as, individuals.  Multiple 
commentators have noted that most women in the workplace, even 
those who do not believe themselves to be the victims of explicit 
sexual harassment or offensive behavior, nonetheless “do not feel 
that they are treated as equals in the workplace, and survey data 
indicate that they have reason for this belief.”202  While the specter of 
                                                          
 201. See Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 3 (noting that sexual harassment claims 
increased fifty percent during the 1990s); Abrams, supra note 94, at 1197-98 (“Fifty-
three percent of working women report having experienced behavior that they 
describe as sexual harassment.”). 
 202. John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace:  An 
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1989) [hereinafter Donohue, 
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination]. 
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sexual harassment is, in part, a cause of these feelings,203 the more 
significant cause is the continued existence in the workplace of 
gender norms and stereotypes. 
The power of these norms cannot be overstated.  “Informal social 
norms not only constrain our conduct in relation to others, they also 
shape our expectations about how others will behave toward us.”204  
Katherine Franke has described sexual harassment as “a sexually 
discriminatory wrong because of the gender norms it reflects and 
perpetuates.”205  She argues that other theories of sexual harassment 
focus only on the harm done to women and fail to recognize that 
“sexism . . . is something that affects and regulates us all, male and 
female. . . . [T]he net effect of [sexist] conduct extends beyond any 
particular case in that it solidifies what ‘real men’ and ‘real women’ 
should be.”206 
The perpetuation of these norms may reflect “part of a 
discriminatory backlash:  a last-ditch effort by men to preserve the 
playgrounds of male power from female competitors.”207 While “[n]ot 
all workplace harassment of women is motivated by a desire—explicit 
or implicit—to keep women out of male-dominated jobs,” Rosa 
Ehrenreich argues that “failure to recognize that much—perhaps 
most—workplace harassment of women is motivated by 
discriminatory male attitudes would be to miss the forest for the 
trees.”208  Vicki Schultz, too, has noted that “[h]arassment has the 
form and function of denigrating women’s competence for the 
purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or 
incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers.”209 
                                                          
 203. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1208; see id. (“Sexual inquiries, jokes, remarks, or 
innuendos sometimes can raise the spectre of coercion, but they more predictably 
have the effect of reminding a woman that she is viewed as an object of sexual 
derision rather than as a credible coworker.”). 
 204. Krieger, supra note 3, at 478. 
 205. Franke, supra note 71, at 693. 
 206. Id. at 763; see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1689 (1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing] (“[M]any men are harmed 
at work by gender-based harassment that fits only uneasily within the parameters of a 
sexualized paradigm.”). 
 207. Ehrenreich, supra note 107, at 16. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 206, at 1755.  In addition, Schultz 
explains that harassment does not need to be sexual to maintain a male-dominated 
work place: 
To render visible many of the nonsexual forms of harassment that remain 
hidden, we should also recognize that much of the behavior that creates a 
hostile work environment is conduct that has the purpose or effect of 
undermining the perceived or actual competence of women (and some 
men) who threaten the idealized masculinity of those who do the work.  By 
engaging in hostile work environment harassment, incumbent male workers 
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While Title VII has almost certainly helped to facilitate some 
change in views “about the propriety of certain forms of workplace 
harassment,”210 the fact remains that “because men still exercise 
control over most workplaces, their views of sexual behavior in the 
workplace remain the norm, the measure of ‘business as usual.’”211  
Thus, “[s]exual harassment is a potent reminder that the entry of 
women into the workplace is the beginning, not the end, of a social 
transformation.”212 
Indeed, to Kathryn Abrams, the effort to change these norms 
represents the second major fight of the battle for gender equality in 
the workplace.213  She writes that 
one can describe the struggle for gender equality in the workplace 
as having two overlapping phases:  the first concerned with ending 
the exclusion of women from many types of employment, and the 
second concerned with transforming the male-centered norms that 
created both the exclusion and the workplace as women now find 
it. . . . [T]he present day finds us not at the end of the path, but 
navigating a crucial bend in the road.214 
To her, these norms have tangible consequences in the 
workplace.215  “Women who fought for access to jobs, property, and 
the political arena have discovered that increased access alone does 
not create conditions in which equality is possible.  Women often are 
channeled into jobs that accord them little respect and few 
opportunities for advancement.”216  In addition, 
                                                          
lay claim to certain forms of work and the competence entailed as 
specifically masculine forms of labor. 
Id. at 1762.  She further explains that 
much of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men) 
endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even 
sexual in content.  Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of harassment 
are actions that are designed to maintain work—particularly the more highly 
rewarded lines of work—as bastions of masculine competence and authority. 
Id. at 1686-87.  Moreover, she contends that “harassment functions as a way of 
undermining women’s perceived competence as workers.”  Id. at 1712. 
 210. Coleman, supra note 98, at 248. 
 211. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203. 
 212. Id. at 1197. 
 213. See id. at 1186 (explaining that after gaining access to greater employment 
opportunities, women must alter the norms of male dominance within the 
workplace). 
 214. Id.; see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (“‘Second generation’ claims involve 
social practices and patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that, 
over time, exclude nondominant groups.”). 
 215. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 1187 (finding that male-centered workplace 
norms negatively affect relationships among co-workers, hinder the opportunities for 
women to advance professionally, and subject women to sexual harassment). 
 216. Id. at 1184-85; see Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks:  
Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1025 (1994) (“While it is true 
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[t]hese norms shape intangibles such as the “appropriate” 
professional demeanor:  the tone of voice, air of command, and 
quickness to accommodate or anger that mark a “successful” 
employee.  They also dictate the acceptable forms of professional 
camaraderie, and prescribe the boundaries between the workplace 
and the rest of the world . . . .217 
How then to effect greater change?  How to transform a formal 
equality into a meaningful one in which all doors are open—and 
wide-open—to all people?  Certainly the courts have a role to play.218  
But there is evidence that these norms exist not just in the workplace, 
but in the courts as well.219  As noted above, the fact that most judges 
are men means they may subconsciously be more inclined to side 
with employers in sexual harassment cases.220  In fact, one empirical 
analysis of judicial decision-making found that “female judges 
mattered to outcomes in Title VII sexual harassment and sex 
discrimination cases. . . . Although plaintiffs lost in the majority of 
cases . . . , they were significantly more likely to win when a female 
judge was on the bench.”221   
Moreover, only if women feel comfortable reporting behaviors they 
find offensive when the harassment first occurs will cases presenting 
such conduct make their way to court, allowing these views to be 
challenged.  Only then will judges have the opportunity, should they 
be so inclined, to condemn more and additional types of offensive 
                                                          
that anti-discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory conduct, not prejudice or 
stereotypes, much discriminatory conduct is based on stereotypical attitudes about 
the characteristics and qualifications of women and minorities.”); Posner, supra note 
24, at 1317-21 (noting that among the causes of discrimination against women are 
ignorance and generalizations about the average working woman); cf. Estlund, supra 
note 25, at 73 (stating that expressions of hostility in the workplace “may undermine 
workplace equality and reinforce occupational segregation”).  As Donohue and 
Heckman have noted in the context of race, much of Title VII’s value came from 
“overcom[ing] the informal enforcement mechanisms of the [segregationist] norm 
or forc[ing] people who do not share the law’s premise of equality to confront that 
view.”  John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 
79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1729 (1991). 
 217. Abrams, supra note 94, at 1189.  Abrams argues for “an approach that 
transforms the dominant male norms by integrating norms that reflect women’s 
needs and experiences.”  Id. at 1192. 
 218. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 478 (finding that case law advances and changes 
informal social norms). 
 219. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 1203 (explaining that many court opinions in 
sexual harassment cases display male-centered norms that view such harassment as 
“harmless amusement, or as the treatment women should expect when they push 
their way into the workplace”). 
 220. Id.; see Krieger, supra note 3, at 485 (“The operation of subtle cognitive and 
motivational biases which distort social perception and judgment may further 
constrain the implementation of transformative law.”). 
 221. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:  Gender and Collegial 
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1786-87 (2005). 
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behavior, and only then will we, perhaps, begin to see changes in the 
case law.  To the extent that judicial decisions and definitions do help 
to define what is acceptable and what is not, the fact that women may 
be deterred from bringing these claims may mean that we are losing 
one possible means by which we can bring about change in societal 
norms and stereotypes.222 
But history teaches that a conversation limited to the confines of 
the courtroom is not enough.  If the social transformation is to 
continue, we will need a larger, national conversation about which 
behaviors are acceptable and which are not.223  As one commentator 
has noted, “[D]irect complaint of harassment is crucial.  This is true 
whether we consider the instrumental power of the law (‘law as tool’) 
or its often more complex rhetorical and discursive power.”224  If we 
assume that some sexually harassing behavior is not motivated by the 
intent to harm women, but simply derives from a misunderstanding 
about what is offensive, this behavior can be changed, but only if men 
are alerted to what conduct women find offensive.  But a meaningful 
conversation is only possible if there are multiple actors speaking and 
multiple voices being heard, and this is especially true in the context 
of sexual harassment where women see things so much differently 
than men, and where what changes the “conditions of employment” 
for a woman may seem trivial or insignificant to her male co-worker. 
                                                          
 222. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:  Judicial Interpretations of 
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories] (“Judges’ 
interpretations of sex segregation enter a broader stock of cultural knowledge that 
organizes people’s experience and gives meaning to what we see when we observe 
men and women doing separate tasks in everyday life.”). 
 223. See Sturm, supra note 214, at 462-63 (“[N]ormative elaboration occurs 
through a fluid, interactive relationship between problem solving and problem 
definition within specific workplaces and in multiple other arenas, including but not 
limited to the judiciary.”).  However, a national conversation must also create 
individual conversations to produce social change.  As Cynthia S. Estlund explains in 
the context of race relations: 
We would do much to heal racial divisions if people of different races, and 
particularly black and white citizens, had more conversations—about race 
and, perhaps more importantly, not about race—with each other.  A 
“national conversation about race” may ultimately do less to improve race 
relations in this country than would millions of individual conversations 
among people of different races. 
Estlund, supra note 25, at 50. 
 224. Quinn, supra note 40, at 1154 (citation omitted).  Quinn goes on to explain 
that “[i]f one fails to name the harm as sexual harassment, the law is immobilized 
both ideologically and instrumentally.  It is this instance that informs the present 
analysis, the process by which the law is ‘stilled’—both instrumentally and 
rhetorically—by everyday tactical maneuvers that serve to preclude this requisite 
naming.”  Id. at 1155. 
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As long as we discourage women from speaking out and identifying 
the behavior that they find offensive, this conversation will be 
meaningless, and we will be unable to replace male-driven norms 
with a more realistic assessment of what all members of society find 
offensive.  Indeed, if women are reluctant to report the conduct that 
they believe crosses the line, and are thus silenced, that silence will in 
effect reinforce existing norms about what is and is not acceptable in 
the workplace.225  And to the extent that women do feel comfortable, 
or at least more comfortable, reporting offensive behavior once it has 
become “severe or pervasive,” that later reporting may lead some to 
conclude that the earlier harassment was not offensive, and that the 
pre-existing norms are the correct ones.226 
Thus, again, the “reasonableness” requirement and the narrow 
ways in which both the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have applied it are 
cause for great concern because they threaten to make it more 
difficult for women to speak out, and to speak out early.  The fact 
that women will not be speaking openly about what behavior they 
find inappropriate and offensive will limit the effectiveness of any 
conversation about appropriate workplace norms and will make it 
more difficult for norms and stereotypes to change.  As noted above, 
this maintenance of the status quo will make it more difficult for 
women to prevail in court and less likely for there to be meaningful 
change in offices around the country. 
And this problem feeds on itself.  The lack of reporting 
perpetuates the existing norms, and the existence of those norms 
then demoralizes women and discourages them from seeking to 
engage in behavior that will change the norms.227  As one 
                                                          
 225. See Bond, supra note 31, at 2494-95 (“Because men have historically been 
over-represented in positions of power in the workplace, their views are often 
considered normative.  Therefore, use of the reasonable person standard runs the 
risk of validating the majority male perspective of acceptable on-the-job behavior.”). 
 226. See Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 202, at 1355-56 (“In the 
absence of legal protection, the response to sexual harassment will frequently be 
either to quietly endure or to quietly leave—neither of which would provide useful 
information to the employer or to prospective workers.”). 
 227. See Estlund, supra note 25, at 73 (“[E]xpression [of hatred, contempt, or 
disrespect in the workplace] may undermine workplace equality and reinforce 
occupational segregation.  Such expression may also poison the workplace as a 
forum for pluralistic exchange and destroy the possibility of constructive 
engagement.”); cf. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment:  The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1629-30 (1991) 
(noting in the context of racial differences that it is particularly troubling “when one 
social disadvantage after another accumulates on one racial group” that has 
historically been the victim of prejudice because, in part, “it severely demoralizes the 
members of the group”).  Moreover, even if women wanted to speak out, the 
existence of these norms may make the workplace an uncomfortable environment in 
which they do not feel comfortable doing so.  Estlund, supra note 25, at 73. 
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commentator has explained, “women’s work aspirations are 
shaped . . . primarily by the structures of incentives and social 
relations within work organizations.”228  Thus, women may internalize 
these norms and submit passively to pre-existing ideas about what 
women can and cannot do in the workplace.  And then when women 
do not speak out as a result, when they are passive and submissive, 
they only reconfirm the view that women are not assertive, not 
capable of control, not deserving of the positions and the respect that 
they have been traditionally denied.229  In other words, they behave in 
ways that further entrench the ideas that society already has about 
women—and, indeed, that many women have about themselves. 
The role that gender norms play in our workplaces is complex, 
pervasive and, perhaps most importantly, persistent.  These norms 
are entrenched, the product of centuries of one way of thinking and 
the experiences that that way of thinking produced.  While it is 
unquestionable that these norms have begun to change—and Title 
VII has played a significant role in that process—much remains to be 
done.  The norms that remain are likely the most intractable, and 
therefore changing them will prove to be the most challenging.  
Commentators have noted that the structure of employer liability for 
sexual harassment is such that it places more emphasis on “policies 
and procedures” and on “providing sexual harassment training to 
their employees . . . [r]ather than providing employers with 
incentives to address the predictors of workplace harassment, such as 
the organization’s culture and the job gender context.”230  Thus, 
changes to organizations’ cultures and contexts will have to come 
from other directions.  A conversation about those contexts and 
                                                          
 228. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 222, at 1816; see Quinn, supra note 40, at 
1160-61 (noting that sexual harassment can “reinforce[] . . . power relations through 
the play of gendered and sexual identities”). 
 229. Schultz explains that traditional gender roles reduce women’s status in the 
workplace: 
By portraying women as naturally “feminine” creatures who approach the 
workworld with preordained preferences for suitably “feminine” work, courts 
validate sexist views of women as inauthentic workers fit only for the lowest-
paying, least-challenging jobs.  By portraying work itself as naturally 
“masculine” or “feminine,” they legitimate the structures and processes 
through which employers construct work and work aspirations in gendered 
terms. 
Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 222, at 1840; see Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 
34, at 63 (noting that the fact that “[h]istorically, women have not fared well in the 
law. . . . reflects society’s perception of the proper place of women”). 
 230. Lawton, Operating, supra note 94, at 198.  Lawton notes that these policies and 
procedures amount to “file cabinet compliance” and “have little effect on the 
incidence of workplace harassment.”  Id. 
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cultures would be a good place to start—if the courts will let it 
happen. 
CONCLUSION 
Although some commentators have criticized the courts for 
intentionally attempting to limit Title VII’s protective reach,231 the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in George hardly appears to be an active 
attempt to limit the protective scope of Title VII’s “opposition 
clause.”  To the contrary, it appears more likely to have been an 
attempt to craft a relatively easy way to deal with a frequently 
recurring problem, that is, identifying when an employee’s 
harassment complaint is reasonable.  Faced with increasingly heavy 
dockets, it is understandable why courts might prefer easy solutions 
to difficult ones.  Yet, as discussed above, the “reasonable juror” test 
adopted in George is too easy, threatening to unnecessarily and 
inappropriately limit the ability of individuals to report what they 
believe to be discrimination without fear of retaliation.  In doing so, it 
threatens to limit the extent to which Title VII’s prohibitions are 
enforced, and just as importantly it threatens to undercut Title VII’s 
other critical, if less tangible, purposes. 
But what is the alternative?  How should courts determine the 
objective reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief that she was the victim 
of sexual harassment?  As much as anything else, the courts’ decisions 
in George and Jordan reveal that there is no good way to define which 
beliefs are reasonable and which are not, especially in the context of 
hostile work environment claims.  And these difficulties in definition 
have serious consequences in this context because they mean that 
individuals are less likely to report harassment, especially in its 
earliest stages, thereby compromising the ability of the anti-
retaliation provision to advance the goals of Title VII.  Balanced 
against these negatives, the benefits of requiring plaintiffs to establish 
the reasonableness of their beliefs as part of their prima facie 
retaliation case are too few, especially when those benefits can be 
served almost as well by allowing employers an affirmative defense to 
liability when they can establish that the plaintiff’s complaint was 
made in bad faith. 
Title VII has been the source of acclaim, controversy, and 
considerable commentary.  Its anti-retaliation provision has been the 
                                                          
 231. Cf., e.g., Symposium, Civil Rights Act, supra note 34, at 793-94 (noting that 
some Title VII lawyers had “stopped bringing Title VII cases because they got such a 
hostile reception from the federal bench that they couldn’t do it any more”). 
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subject of less commentary, but it is no less critical.  Indeed, in some 
respects, it is even more critical because of the fundamental and 
multi-faceted support it provides for Title VII’s substantive anti-
discrimination provision.  Title VII may not be perfect, and its ability 
to achieve equality in the workplace may be limited by various forces 
external to the statute itself, but in its anti-retaliation provision it has 
an internal source of support that should not be discounted, at least 
so long as the courts do not diminish it to nothing.  Courts should 
recognize that the anti-retaliation provision not only helps to prohibit 
discrimination, but also acts to preserve the freedom to speak and to 
heal.  In determining how much opposition activity to protect, the 
courts should interpret the provision so that its breadth is 
commensurate with the many purposes it serves. 
